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Introduction & overview 3
Our daily environment constantly claims our attention. When driv-
ing a car, for example, we continuously process all kinds of information
on the basis of which we have to make intelligent decisions. Using as
much information as possible in those situations has clear advantages, be-
cause the combined information from several modalities often produces
an improved percept compared to information from one modality only
(Calvert, Brammer, & Iversen, 1998). In cognitive science several views
on the nature of human information processing exist. For example, with
respect to the important question whether human information process-
ing is either an active or a passive process, opposing views have been
developed. According to some scientists, people actively search their im-
mediate surroundings to select only those sources of information that are
relevant for task performance (selection for action; Allport, 1987, also see
Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). According to others,
the initial stages of information processing are purely passive and only
after all the information impinging on our senses is taken in, the task–
relevant components are being selected (selective attention; e.g. see Donk
& Theeuwes, 2003; Pashler, 1998b; Theeuwes, 1994; Theeuwes, Godijn, &
Pratt, 2004; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998).
Only very seldom will the environment stimulate only one of our
sensory organs (Meredith, 2002). Usually next to visual stimulation —
for most people the dominant modality (Ernst & Bu¨lthoff, 2004; Stein
& Meredith, 1993)— our hearing will also be active during information
processing, resulting in bimodal stimulation of our cognitive system.
However, often we also rely on, for instance, tactile feedback (a sticky
keyboard) or even olfactory information to guide our multimodal inter-
pretation of the surroundings in which we operate. Olfactory sensation,
however, is mostly not used as a descriptor per se (“Smell the salty sea
breeze”) but rather provokes an emotional or motivational context that
possibly influences other, more rationally determined decisions (“Take a
shower before you come by to discuss your paper’s grade”).
It may be even the case that a great paper does not receive proper
recognition because of negative associations a reviewer has with smelly
people. Such incompatibilities between the rational and emotional eval-
uation of situations are in abundance in daily life. These dimensions of
decision making have been labeled “hot” and “cold” cognition, respec-
tively (Abelson, 1963; also seeHoffman, 1986; Hollnagel, 1999; Sorrentino
& Higgins, 1986a). Alternatively, consider, for example, driving your car
in a hurry and approaching an intersection with traffic lights. During
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your approach you might hear the siren of an ambulance. If you have a
red light when you reach the intersection, the interpretation of auditory
and visual information are compatible: by law the red traffic light tells
you to stop and the law tells you to giveway to an ambulancedrivingwith
siren and horn. However, when the light is green, allowing you to reach
your destination quicker, the light and the siren provide conflicting, in-
compatible information, usually resulting in an increased response–time
latency to execute the appropriate response (here, pressing the brake).
Now imagine being rescued successfully by an ambulance at some time
in your past. This will likely change your emotion hearing the siren. Is it
in this case easier for you (i.e., can you be quicker) to press the brake pad-
dle of your car, or does your personal affective–evaluation of the siren not
affect that response? In this example, the siren of the ambulance provided
additional (new) information that required a different interpretation of a
situation that you were confronted with while driving your car.
Usually the various sources of information available to people, not
all bear relevance to their task performance. Indeed, in a lot of circum-
stances (multimodal) information presents itself in which part of that
information is not relevant for a correct or appropriate execution of the
task at hands. For instance, working with a computer often requires the
use of a hierarchical menu–structure that can be very deep. An interface
designer might consider adding sound to the computer interface to help
users navigate within the menu structure; this sound, however, is not
a necessity for proper navigation. The designer can use the pitch of a
tone because pitch is a suitable auditory dimension to represent height
(Walker, 2002; Walker & Ehrenstein, 2000). As a menu tree resembles
a real tree, the designer might associate low(er) tones with menu items
close to the roots of the tree. Going up higher into the branches and
the leaves, the designer may use higher–pitched sounds. Surprisingly,
research has shown that most users prefer the inverse relation between
pitch andmenu–depth: The deeper into themenu structure, the lower the
sound should be (Walker & Ehrenstein, 2000). Thus, the original idea of
high–pitched tones for items deep in the menu structure can be called an
incompatible relation between pitch and position in the menu structure
(at least for most people; B. Walker, personal communication, September
29, 2004; also see Walker, 2002), resulting in worse performance (mea-
sured in terms of errors committed or perhaps time to reach a certain
position in the structure) compared to the compatible combination with
lower sounds representing deeper positions in the menu structure.
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The abovementioned examples of combined audio–visual informa-
tion processing present in human task–performance, or processing of in
general multimodal or multisensory stimuli form a normal part of our
daily information–processing life. Meredith (2002) describes a multisen-
sory stimulus as “an event which generates several independent physical
‘energies’ each of which is simultaneously detectable by different types
of sensory receptors” (p. 32). Only because the human nervous system
has been designed in an environment that generates those multisensory
events, has it been possible that the physical energies produced or re-
flected by the events indeed do not go undetected. Meredith calls these
physical energies the stimuli. The cross–modal aspect of such multi-
modal stimulation usually refers to the fact that the processes encoding
the initially separate information–streams may affect each other in either
beneficial or counterproductive ways, or stated in other words, that by–
products of the processing of one sensory organ may carry over to the
processing or end product of another sensory modality. The end result
of a multimodal stimulus is therefore often different from a simple accu-
mulation of the perception of each individual component of the stimulus
(Meredith, 2002).
1.1 Cross–modal perception
Human sensory–modalities are selectively tuned to process certain stim-
ulus characteristics. Gaver (1989) noted that auditory stimuli seemed
specifically appropriate to relay information that changes (rapidly) and
does not require direct, focused attention: Sound exists in time and over
space. The visual system, on the other hand, is not equipped to handle
rapidly changing information (certainly not in comparisonwith audition,
the latter being able to distinguish events presented only 2ms apart; vi-
sion, however, requiring at least 100ms intervals between two stimuli;
Fraisse, 1981) but vision can be used to describe static objects that require
close inspection: Vision exists over time and in space. Although vision
might be our dominant sense (Stein & Meredith, 1993), we rely on hear-
ing as our only panoramic, long–range sensory system (King, Schnupp,
& Doubell, 2001). In general, an auditory stimulus is processed around
30–50ms faster than a visual stimulus (Fujisaki, Shimojo, Kashino, &
Nishida, 2004; Stein & Meredith, 1993).
The modality–appropriateness hypothesis formulated byWelch, Dut-
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tonHurt, andWarren (1986) was the foundation for Gaver’s observations.
This hypothesis suggests that each sensory modality is capable of a vari-
ety of tasks but that they all have some functions that they can perform
better than the other modalities. For instance, in a localization task with
visual–auditory stimuli, vision will be biased over audition because vi-
sion is more appropriately designed to handle localization (Calvert et al.,
1998). Note that a “more appropriate design” does not necessarily imply
enhanced precision (Welch et al., 1986, p. 660). Alternatively, vestibular
activation can change the apparent location of a sound (Stein &Meredith,
1993).
However, dominance of one modality over another one goes further
than only for specific multimodal stimuli. For some people information
processing in general is more visually oriented, usually enabling them
to focus on visual task–aspects more than people who’s processing is
dominated by audition. Visually dominated people are therefore better
capable of ignoring auditory information in a task in which both the vi-
sual and the auditory modality are stimulated (Giard & Peronnet, 1999).
Dominance of specific modalities can change throughout the entire pe-
riod of cognitive development. Children, for instance, have been found
to be dominatedmuchmore by auditionwhereasmost adults are visually
dominant, perhaps reflecting a gradual change, over the course of adoles-
cence, from language learner (requiringmuchmore auditory attention) to
object perceiver (requiring a visually oriented system, Sloutsky&Napoli-
tano, 2003). Giard and Peronnet (1999) noted that auditorily–dominated
adults are often musically skilled.
Modality appropriateness (Welch et al., 1986) and modality domi-
nance are phenomena due to the very nature of multimodal stimuli. A
well known example of a cross–modal effect caused by different infor-
mation in the individual (unimodal) parts of a multimodal stimulus, is
the McGurk effect (McGurk & MacDonald, 1976). This effect consists of
a final percept that is different from either the visual or the auditory part
alone. If participants hear “baba” while they see a speaker articulating
“gaga” their cognitive system combines these two information–streams
into “dada”. Another example is the ventriloquism effect (Howard &
Templeton, 1966) referring to various on–line as well as off–line mani-
festations of cross–modal spatial interaction in auditory–visual sensory
conflict–situations (Bertelson, 1999) that show perceptual fusion despite
spatial discrepancy between the auditory and visual sources. Vroomen
and de Gelder (2000) showed an enhancement of the perception of a tar-
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get when a high tone, embedded in a series of low tones, was presented
synchronously with the visual target in the sequence of distracters. The
enhancement did not depend on factors like rhythm or order–based an-
ticipation.
These findings all point towards a cognitive interface subject to an
interaction of initially separate auditory and visual information process-
ing that seems to take place early on in the information–processing chain
(Bertelson, Vroomen, de Gelder, & Driver, 2000; Fort, Delpuech, Pernier,
& Giard, 2002; Giard & Peronnet, 1999).
1.2 Stimulus–response compatibility
So a computer–interface designer, thinking that a menu–tree grows into
the air like a normal tree thus associating going up with higher pitch,
created an interface–layout most users find awkward or in another word,
incompatible. Stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) has been a major
theme in (fundamental) experimental psychology as well as in human–
factors research (Proctor & Reeve, 1990) and refers to a (in)comparability
of some feature of a stimulus and a response that influences informa-
tion processing. When two stimulus features have a relationship that
is not according to a strong population stereotype (Fitts & Seeger, 1953;
Fitts & Deininger, 1954), we generally speak of incompatible stimulus–
features. Stimulus–response relationships not necessarily need be either
compatible or incompatible. They may not even exist. For instance, if
participants are instructed to press a left button if they see a red dot and
a right button if they see a green dot, then color is the relevant stimulus–
feature that determines the response. Because stimuli can be coded by
color and responses are expressed as locations, no comparability exists
between the relevant stimulus feature and the response and there can be
no (in)compatibility between stimulus and response.
Now consider that the red or green dots are presented to the left or
right of a centrally presented point of fixation. The stimulus now carries
two potentially important features: the task–relevant feature still is color
which, as indicated above, is dissimilar with the locational feature of
the response. However, the lateralized presentation introduces a task–
irrelevant feature to the stimulus that does overlap with the response.
This setup results in two possible situations. Remember that participants
were instructed topress the left button for a reddot. If this dot is presented
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to the left of the point of fixation, the location of the stimulus matches the
location of the response which is called stimulus–response compatible.
If, on the other hand, the red dot is presented to the right of fixation,
this would result in a stimulus–response incompatible trial. In this setup
participants typically respond around 50ms–60ms slower to stimulus–
response incompatible trials than to stimulus–response compatible trials,
an effect that has become known as the spatial Simon effect (Simon, 1969,
1990; Simon & Rudell, 1967).
In general, the properties of a stimulus that determine the response
to be executed, usually specified in the instruction to the participants,
are referred to as the relevant stimulus–aspect(s) or relevant stimulus–
feature(s) (or “the relevant stimulus”, abbreviated as S r). Task–irrelevant
stimulus–properties (S i) are all remaining aspects of a stimulus that are
not directly relevant for determining the appropriate response. Some-
times they are called task–irrelevant properties to emphasize that the
properties are irrelevant for proper task–execution. Nevertheless, they
may have an impact on the processing of the relevant aspects as exem-
plified in the spatial Simon effect. The relevant response–feature, or the
feature distinguishing the responses, or just “the response” is the re-
sponse feature (abbreviated as R ) that allows the different responses to
be distinguished. For instance, if one response button is located on the
left of a response box and another one is located on the right of that box,
R is location.
The relations between the relevant stimulus features and the response
but also those between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus features are
called either compatible or incompatible, or also congruent versus incon-
gruent.1 These relations can be phrased in terms of dimensional overlap
between stimulus and response (Kornblum, 1994) where “dimensional”
refers to the shared aspects of stimulus (S i or S r) and response (R ), and
overlap refers to the degree of similarity. For instance in the spatial Si-
mon task there is dimensional overlap based on location of the irrelevant
stimulus–feature and the response. In the type of research described in
this thesis, similarity usually is all or none: shared stimulus and response
features are very alike, or on opposite sides of the scale of similarity.
Of course, dimensional overlap can exist between multiple features of a
single stimulus.
1Within the SRC research arena, the distinction between compatibility, congruency,
and consistency is usually upheld more stringent (Kornblum & Lee, 1995; Kornblum,
Stevens, & Requin, 1999; also see Hommel, 1997, Footnote 1).
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Note that although the term “dimensional overlap” was coined by
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, and Osman (1990) as an integral part of their
dimensional–overlap model of SRC phenomena, it is often used without
direct reference to thatmodel, both in this thesis aswell as in the literature
on this subject, solely referring to the similarity between S r, S i, and R.
Also note that it may seem as if the relevant and irrelevant features of a
stimulus are separate entities, certainly in the context of the multimodal
stimuli where one modality is often used to present the task–irrelevant
information and another modality exclusively presents the task–relevant
features. This is, however, not necessarily always the case: The initially
separate information–streams are assumed to be perceived as an inte-
grated whole.
1.3 Affective information processing
Another topic briefly mentioned above was the impact of motivational
context or affective appreciation on information processing. The pro-
cessing of emotionally–labeled information, evaluative information, or
affectively–valenced information (often called “hot” cognition, Abelson,
1963) was long considered to be completely separated from the cold ra-
tional decisions that humans make (“cold” cognition, Hollnagel, 1999),
perhaps partly because of the computer metaphor (Shannon & Weaver,
1969) that dominated experimental psychology and human–factors re-
search for a long time (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986a). The labels affective
valence, affective value, evaluative information, or affective property all
refer to the same notion: some aspect, not otherwise specified, of a stim-
ulus or a response carries a certain load that is processed more easily
within an emotional (“hot”), rather than a rational (“cold”) framework.
Commonsense, however, seems to contradict this complete separation
of hot and cold cognition: It is not just common–sense politeness to take a
shower before an application meeting. Such a personal impression based
on affect can easily influence decisions even if the application committee
tries very hard not to be influenced by it. As another example, even for
life–long partners a very sensible discussion on the spending of a minor
amount of money can become a heated debate with a fewwords carrying
an unexpected and often unintended emotional charge. In Western tonal
music, themajor/minor distinction is a powerfulmeans to change or affect
the (conscious and cold) perception of a piece from happy and positive
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to sad and negative (although exceptions exist; see Pittenger, 2003).
This well evolved (although occasionally volatile) domain of human–
human interaction has often been used as starting point in human–factors
reseach to improve the design of human–computer interaction. In a
similar fashion as in experimental psychology (Sorrentino & Higgins,
1986b), the impact of emotion on human–human interaction has been
ignored in human–factors research for a long period until Picard (1997)
proposed the notion of affective computing by which she referred to
all computing that displays and understands affect. Affective computing
therefore seeks to improvehuman–computer interactionby incorporating
the motivational and emotional factors that are so influential in human–
human interaction.
1.4 Outline of this thesis
The studies that we report in this thesis are ordered chronologically,
reflecting the transition of this project from amore or less purely human–
factors researchproject (e.g. seeLemmens, Bussemakers, &deHaan, 2000,
2001; Lemmens, de Haan, & van Galen, 2003), to a more hybrid approach
of basic experimental researchwith potential human–factors applications
in mind. The critical evaluation of the research approach that we have
adopted that we present near the end of this thesis in Chapter 5 indicates
that extending the lifetime of the project might have resulted in a second
move taking it even further away from human–factors research.
The next chapter (Ch. 2) elaborates on the research topics that were
briefly touched upon earlier in this chapter. Based on an overview of the
theories and findings in the stimulus–response compatibility literature,
we argue that SRC phenomena can be used in the domain of affective
processing, and that SRC paradigms can be exploited as a simpler way to
investigate the impact of affect on cold cognitive processing compared to
the direct but cumbersomemeasures of responses of the autonomous ner-
vous system (blood–volume pressure, galvanic skin–conductivity, etc.)
that are currently used in affective–computing research. We also ar-
gue that the major/minor distinction in Western tonal music can be used
to transform families of affect–neutral earcons (which are brief musical
fragment used in some man–machine interfaces to facilitate, for instance,
navigation; Blattner, Sumikawa, & Greenberg, 1989) into variations that
carry an affective load.
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Chapter 3 examines in more detail the transformation of earcons into
major and minor variations in the context of affective computing. We
investigate whether the affective valence of earcons in major or minor
mode (associated with positive and negative valence, respectively) can
overlap with the affective property of the responses in a picture–catego-
rization task. If the earcons and the responses have dimensional overlap,
different congruency conditions can be expected. For instance, a combi-
nation of an earcon in major mode and a positive response would result
in an affectively–congruent trial whereas an earcon in major mode and a
negative response would be affectively incongruent. Finding differences
in the response–time latencies to congruent trials versus incongruent tri-
als would indicate that the transformation was successful in creating
affectively–charged earcons. Insights into the conditions under which
multimodal affective–congruency effects occur, are important to formu-
late targeted advice how tomaintain affective correspondence in affective
human–computer interfaces.
Chapter 4 explores the affective–congruency effect in more detail than
was undertaken in the study reported in Chapter 3. In the study re-
ported in Chapter 4 we use a slightly different experimental setup to
try and replicate our earlier findings. We discuss that the multimodal
affective–congruency effect represents a comparison across modalities of
affectively–charged information. We argue that themultimodal research–
approach provides a new method, in addition to existing visually–ori-
ented paradigms, to investigate affective–information processing. We
show that judgemental tendencies (see Klauer & Stern, 1992; Wentura,
2000) play an important role in realizing the multimodal affective–con-
gruency effect. We contend that the judgemental tendencies are a cogni-
tive strategy to simplify the procedure to select the instructed response.
A third and final experimental study, which we report in Chapter 5,
critically evaluates the experimental set–ups used in the experiments
described in Chapters 3 and 4. We argue that the class homogeneity
of the sets of animals and inanimate objects is an important factor in
studies that employ the animate/inanimate distinction (e.g., Brousseau &
Buchanan, 2004) and that differences in the homogeneity of categories of
stimuli may introduce artifacts in the multimodal affective–congruency
effect. Several explanations of the congruency effect are investigated and
we explore the extent of the influence of the homogeneity differences in
the realization of the congruency effect.
In the general discussion, Chapter 6 (“Summary and conclusions”),
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the experimental findings reported in this thesis are recapitulated and
discussed in relation to affective computing as well as to the main the-
ories concerning affective–compatibility effects that are reported in the
literature. We not only show how the paradigms that we used might
be exploited in future stimulus–response compatibility research aimed
to improve our insights into affective–information processes but also in-
dicate the various ways in which our research can be applied to the
cognitive–ergonomic domain of affective computing. We end the chapter
with a description of the contours of a tentative model of hot and cold
cognition that encapsulates our findings and lines of reasoning.
C 2
Stimulus–Response Compatibility and
Affective Computing: A Review†
I often say that when you can measure
what you are speaking about, and
express it in numbers, you know
something about it; but when you
cannot measure it, when you cannot
express it in numbers, your knowledge
is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.
Lord Kelvin (1824–1907)
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Abstract
Affective computing, a human–factors effort to investigate the merits of
emotions while people are working with human–computer interfaces, is
gaining momentum. Measures to quantify affect (or its influences) range
from EEG, to measurements of autonomic–nervous–system responses
(e.g., heart rate, blood pressure), to less objective self–reports. Here we
claim that simple response–time measurements may be a viable alter-
native to (indirectly) measure the effects of affect on performance by
providing a review of experimental paradigms and associated models
of human information processing. In particular, we focus on stimulus–
response compatibility paradigms that have provided important insights
for human–factors research, for instance regarding the important role of
the spatial layout of interface design on the efficiency of human task per-
formance, to show that these paradigms can also be applied to investigate
the role of affect in human–computer interaction.
†This chapter is submitted as: Lemmens, P. M. C., de Haan, A., van Galen, G. P., &
Meulenbroek, R. G. J. (2004). Stimulus–Response Compatibility and Affective Computing: A
Review. Manuscript submitted to Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science.
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2.1 Introduction
Traditionally cognitive science and experimental psychology have in-
vestigated information processing within individuals (e.g. see Donders,
1868/1969; Kornblum et al., 1990; Sternberg, 1969). Since recently, how-
ever, the research investigating interindividual information–processing
is gaining momentum (e.g. see Frith & Wolpert, 2003; van Schie, Mars,
Coles, & Bekkering, 2004). Interindividual communication and infor-
mation processing has been one of the pillars of human–factors research
to improve human–computer interaction by trying to make it more like
human–human interaction, for instance by using natural–language di-
alogue. Although often ignored, an essential component of human–
human interaction is emotion: A wealth of non–verbal information can
be conveyed by gestures or prosody. Even without verbal communica-
tion, humans often feel an immediate like or dislike for a person they
meet for the first time, or, even between life–long partners communi-
cation can ignite a fierce debate with only a few sentences carrying an
unexpected and (usually) unintended emotional charge. The success of
emoticons in human–computer–human communication (email, chatting
andonline–presence software) corroborates the important role of emotion
in human–human and human–computer interaction.
Originally human–computer interaction (HCI) did not involve emo-
tion at all; the computer was seen as a binary machine devoid of any
possibilities to position its responses between the extremes of zero and
one and users simply had to adapt to that situation (Brave & Nass, 2003).
A similar perspective was taken in experimental psychology where emo-
tion (hot cognition) and reason (cold cognition) were long taken to be
completely separated (e.g., Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986a). Picard (1997),
therefore, argued that perception and appropriate presentation of affect
by a computer might facilitate interaction with users and improve user
performance in, as well as user satisfaction of, such an interface. She
proposed to investigate Affective Computing which she defined as ‘all
computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences emo-
tions’.
Perhaps one of the reasons why hot and cold cognition have been
viewed as separate is that the former is usually associated with responses
on the level of the autonomous nervous system (e.g. heart rate, blood–
volume pressure, skin conductivity, Brave & Nass, 2003) whereas the
latter is associated with higher cognitive mechanisms. Most experiments
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measuring (the influence of) affect on HCI have therefore tapped into
those autonomous nervous systems (the galvanic skin–response, GSR,
Healey, Picard, & Dabek, 1998; Ward & Marsden, 2003; blood–volume
pressure, BVP, Ward &Marsden, 2003; electromyograms, EMG, Scheirer,
Fernandez, Klein, & Picard, 2002; or squeeze pressure on computer mice,
van Galen, Liesker, & de Haan, 2004; van de Ven, 2002). Although these
measures all have the benefit of directly measuring an affect–associated
(autonomous nervous system) response, their downside is the currently
rather cumbersome devices required for carrying out the measurements
that, from a user’s perspective, probably neutralise potential benefits of
the addition of affect in an interface.
In this reviewwe therefore propose to exploit stimulus–response com-
patibility (SRC) paradigms to study the role of affect in HCI as a viable
albeit indirect alternative to the direct measures of EEG, GSR, BVP, and
EMG. We will do so by first providing a brief overview of response–
time paradigms and associated models of human information process-
ing. Then the dimensional–overlap model and a taxonomy of stimulus–
response compatibility paradigms is presented and the well–known Si-
mon task is isolated to demonstrate the power of SRC in the domain of
affective computing research. We complete our review by showing that
earcons (Blattner et al., 1989) in major or minor mode as known from
Western tonal music, may be a possible means to communicate emotions
or affect in HCI. To the best of our knowledge this is a role for earcons
that has not received much attention yet.
2.1.1 Brief historic overview
Donders (1868/1969) formulated a way to investigate human informa-
tion processing by demonstrating that some tasks take longer to initiate
than others. He proposed a stage insertion/deletion method in which
a relatively simple task could be made a bit more difficult by requiring
participants to do an extra ‘computation’ before executing a response. By
carefully manipulating this extra computation, Donders reasoned that
the time needed by this computation could be deduced by subtracting
the time to initiate the easier task from the time to start the more difficult
task, much like comparing the latency to generate the outcome of the sum
3 + 4 with that of the sum 3 + 4 + 5. To implement this general method
in more detail, Donders defined three characteristic tasks that differed
in the processes needed to correctly fulfill the task requirements. Type a
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reactions/tasks were simple RTs reflecting only sensory and motor pro-
cesses. The b–type reactions were choice RTs with two stimulus and two
response alternatives (including discrimination and response choice next
to the sensory andmotor processes of the a–type task), whereas the type c
reactions were similar to a go/no–go paradigm (with discrimination pro-
cesses but no response choice). This way the duration of, for instance,
the response–choice process could be estimated by subtracting response
times of c–tasks from b–tasks. This method of pure stage insertion was
the first processing–stages approach to choice RT (Sanders, 1998).
However, difficulties were found creating sufficiently different type b
and type c tasks as it appeared that both types of tasks required response
choice. To overcome the methodological as well as statistical criticisms
on Donders’ subtraction method, Sternberg (1969) defined the Additive
Factors Method (AFM, sometimes also referred to as Additive Factors
Logic, AFL) that assumed, like the subtraction method of Donders, that
response–time latencies consist of the sum of the intervals that a sequen-
tially orderedmodular set of processing stages take to translate a stimulus
into response and start executing this response (Sanders, 1998). Each of
these stages takes care of processing a certain aspect of the stimulus or
response, possibly influenced by an experimentalmanipulation. The ben-
efit of the AFM over Donders’ method were the statistical assumptions
that Sternberg formulated, creating a solid statistical framework inwhich
experimental results from factorial designs could be interpreted in only a
single way. Interactions between two (or more) factors signified that all
factors acted upon the same information processing stage whereas addi-
tive effects implied that each involved factor influenced a different stage.
Thus, during the heydays of the AFM around seven different stages were
proposed or discovered, amongst which the stages of Feature Extraction,
Stimulus Identification, Response Selection, andMotor Programming re-
ceived most attention and consensus (Gopher & Sanders, 1984; Sanders,
1980, 1983, 1990, 1998).
However, these statistical premises, including ones derived from the
basic assumptions, were violated quite easily. For instance, the stage–
robustness criterion (Gopher & Sanders, 1984), a derived assumption
arguing for constancy of the stage structure over many variations (in-
cluding number) of factors over experiments, was violated using stimuli
typically used in experiments employing stimulus–response compatibil-
ity paradigms (Ridderinkhof, van der Molen, & Bashore, 1995; Sanders,
1998). Dual–route architectureswere proposed (de Jong, Liang, &Lauber,
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1994; Kornblum et al., 1990; Ridderinkhof et al., 1995) to overcome the
limitations that the AFM imposed on SRC experiments.
2.1.2 Stimulus–response compatibility
Astudy by Fitts andDeininger (1954) is one of themost often cited studies
to introduce stimulus–response compatibility research. They instructed
one group of participants to move a stylus to the left if, for instance, a
stimulus light on the 9 o’clock position of circle of lights was turned on
whereas another group of participants was instructed to move the stylus
to the right in response to the same stimulus. It is clear that the task was
more difficult for the second group than for the first group of participants
because of the spatial incompatibility between the relative position of
the stimulus versus the direction of the response. Although Fitts and
Deininger termed the condition of the second group S–R mirrored, these
types of stimulus–response assignments have become known as incom-
patible stimulus–response combinations.
The widely used Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) is
another example of a task that capitalizes on stimulus–response compat-
ibility effects. In a variation with arrows, the flanking arrows could point
in the same or opposite direction as the centrally presented target arrow,
resulting in compatible or incompatible trial types,1 respectively (Rid-
derinkhof et al., 1995). Compatibility of the direction of the target arrow
and the flankers influenced response–time latencies: RTs to incompatible
trials were significantly slower than those to compatible trials. The spa-
tial Simon task (Simon, 1990) is also considered to elicit SRC effects, as is
the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; Proctor & Reeve, 1990). These tasks will be
discussed below.
Stimulus–response compatibility has been a major topic in human–
factors research since the work of Fitts and Seeger (1953; also see Fitts
& Deininger, 1954). Laxar and Olson (1978), for instance, showed that
SRC is an important factor for judgements on computer–generated dia-
grams of submarine movements. Burke, Gilson, and Jagacinsky (1980)
highlighted the importance of SRC in multimodal displays intended to
relieve visual workload. Brown (1988) wrote an entire chapter on SRC in
a book on HCI–design guidelines and Proctor and Reeve (1990) already
1In contrast to some researchers who explicitly use different terms for different the
different relations between S r, S i, and R like congruency, consistency, correspondence
as well as compatibility, for the present review we will use the words interchangeably.
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dedicated a part of their book on the theme of SRC and human–factors.
Like Andre andWickens (1990), Kantowitz and Campbell (1996) stressed
the impact of stimulus–response compatibility on a pilot’s work load. For
directional compatibility, Worringham and Beringer (1998) showed that
visual–field compatible conditions were associatedwith shorter response
time latencies, movement and homing–in times. Summarising, Vu and
Proctor (2003) stated that spatial SRC effects are robust (see Hommel,
1997) and occur across different sensory modalities, stimulus modes, re-
sponse modalities, and display arrangements. Thus, stimulus–response
compatibility effects are widespread throughout cognitive performance
and in human–factors research the general rule to maintain (spatial) cor-
respondence emerged as an important interface design guideline.
Kornblum et al. (1990) tried to systematise the different paradigms
employed in stimulus–response compatibility research by classifying the
stimulus–response relations (see Fig. 2.1) of each paradigm into a taxon-
omy of so–called stimulus–response ensembles. To accomplish this, they
formulated the notion of dimensional overlap (DO) referring to ‘the de-
gree to which sets of items are perceptually, structurally, or conceptually
similar’ and presupposed that ‘dimensional overlap affects performance
whether theoverlappingdimensions are task–relevant or not’ (Kornblum,
1994, p. 130). Although dimensional overlap did not exclude degrees of
overlap on a continuous scale, Kornblum et al. (1990) varied the rela-
tions between S i, S r, and R in a binary fashion, resulting in eight possible
ensembles.2
For instance, a taskhaving adimensional overlap (DO)betweenS r and
R is called aType–2 ensemble (seeTable 2.1). A typical Type–2 ensemble is
the spatial compatibility study by Fitts and Deininger (1954; also see Fitts
& Seeger, 1953) that we described above. In these types of S–R ensembles
the relevant stimulus feature S r is location, which is also the feature that
distinguishes the individual responses R. The Stroop task (Stroop, 1935)
belongs to the most complex ensemble of the taxonomy: the irrelevant
colour–words create have an overlapwith the relevant ink–colour (S i – S r)
as well as with the response (pronounce the name of the ink–colour; S i –
R ). Because there is also overlap for S r –R (the ink–colour and its name),
the Type–8 ensemble, towhich the Stroop task belongs, is characterised by
2Recently Stevens and Kornblum (2000) extended the number of possible ensem-
bles to around twelve to also include response–effect compatibilities (e.g. Beckers, De
Houwer, & Eelen, 2002; Koch & Kunde, 2002; Kunde, Hoffmann, & Zellmann, 2002;
Kunde, 2003; also see Kornblum & Stevens, 2002).
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Irrelevant (S i)Relevant (Sr) Relevant (R)
Stimulus features Response feature(s)
Relevant Sr –R
Irrelevant S i –RIrrelevant S i –Sr
Figure 2.1: Three possible relations between the relevant (S r) and irrelevant (S i) aspects
of the stimulus and the relevant response feature (R ) used to create eight ensembles in
the dimensional overlap taxonomy (Kornblum et al., 1990). Figure adapted from Fig. 2
in Hasbroucq and Guiard (1991).
dimensional overlap between all combinations of relevant and irrelevant
stimulus features and response.
Compared to the original spatial–compatibility study carried out by
Fitts and Seeger (1953), the spatial Simon effect (Simon, 1969; Simon
& Craft, 1971; Simon, Hinrichs, & Craft, 1970; Simon & Rudell, 1967;
also see Simon, 1990) is only slightly different: whereas Fitts and Seeger
studied location as the relevant stimulus feature, for the spatial Simon
effect location is task–irrelevant. In Kornblum et al.’s (1990) taxonomy
this conforms to a Type–3 ensemble with no overlaps between S r and
R or between S i and S r. However, for S i –R there is overlap because
the irrelevant stimulus feature is location and location also distinguishes
between the possible responses.
Accompanying the taxonomy, Kornblum et al. (1990) introduced a
dual–route processing model of SRC effects (see Fig. 2.2) consisting of
a stimulus–identification stage and a response–production stage (where
these stages indeed have some characteristics from the stages in the AFM,
cf. Kornblum&Lee, 1995), the latter stagemediating the effects of Type–3
ensembles like those found in the spatial Simon task. This stage consists
of two branches in which one branch is responsible for an automatic
activation of a response based on the dimensional overlap between S i
and R.
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Table 2.1: A taxonomy of S–R ensembles, illustrating the various combinations of di-
mensional overlap with relevant and/or irrelevant dimensions of the stimulus and/or
the response. Table adapted from Table 1 in Kornblum (1994).
Ensemble type Overlapping ensemble dimensions
S–R dimensions S–S dimensions
Relevant Irrelevant
1 No No No
2 Yes No No
3 No Yes No
4 No No Yes
5 Yes Yes No
6 Yes No Yes
7 No Yes Yes
8 Yes Yes Yes
However, before the actual response can be executed, the correct re-
sponse must be identified; this response identification takes place in the
other branch using, for instance, an identity rule. If the automatically
activated response is different from the correct response, the former is
aborted and the program for executing the correct response is retrieved
and executed (Kornblum, 1994). The process of aborting an incorrect
automatic response results in the observed response–time latency differ-
ences for a compatible trial compared to an incompatible trial.
The stimulus–identification stage was constructed in a similar fashion
to the response–selection stage with two separate routes converging to
create a stimulus vector (Kornblum, 1994). The stimulus–identification
stage mediates SRC effects, for instance, for Type–4 ensembles. This
model was (Kornblum, 1994; Kornblum et al., 1990; Kornblum & Lee,
1995) and still is (Kornblum et al., 1999; Kornblum & Stevens, 2002;
Stevens & Kornblum, 2000) successful in explaining many of the SRC
phenomena.
To summarise, so farwe have discussed the chain of stages in informa-
tion–processing that are associated with the AFM, the successor to Don-
ders’ stage–insertion and –deletion method. The assumptions of the
AFM failed, however, for many of the types of tasks and stimuli that


































Figure 2.2: The dimensional overlap processingmodel. The stimulus vector (S.V.)marks
the cutpoint in the network. To the left of the cutpoint is the stimulus identification stage;
to the right the response production stage. si = a stimulus attribute that overlaps with
another stimulus attribute; s j = a stimulus attribute that overlaps with a response at-
tribute; r j = an automatically activated response; rk = the correct response. Reproduced,
with permission, from Figure 1 (including caption) in Kornblum and Lee (1995).
are often used in SRC studies and various notions of dual–route models
succeeded it. Out of these models we presented the dual–route model of
Kornblumet al. (1990) that is associatedwith their taxonomyof stimulus–
response compatibility ensembles. We showed that SRC has been an im-
portant factor inmany human–factors studies. We now discuss affective–
information processing and a variation of the Simon task to show that
SRC paradigms can be used in the domain of affective computing.
2.2 Affective information processing
Earlier in the history of experimental psychology, research on hot cog-
nition (Abelson, 1963) was, to a large extent, separated from that on
cold cognition, perhaps due to the influence of the computer metaphor
(Shannon &Weaver, 1969). Affect, the common denominator of emotion,
mood, and sentiment, was seen as a byproduct or end product of cogni-
tive appraisal (Schacter and Singer, 1962, cited in Hoffman, 1986). During
the 1980s the balance returned to a more favourable position for affect
research: the complexity of the interaction of affect and cognition became
appreciated. Zajonc (1980) argued for independent operation of the af-
fective and cognitive systems, whereas Piaget (1981) related the amount
of intellectual effort and the rate of knowledge acquisition to approach
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and avoidance situations. More recently the computer metaphor and hot
cognition have been brought closer with the advent of affective comput-
ing (Picard, 1997), which is one of the main motivations of the present
review.
Kuhl (Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986a, Ch. 14) distinguished affect or
emotion on the one hand and cognition on the other by emphasising the
representative relation of cognitive processeswith real–world objects and
facts, whereas affective/emotional processes evaluate the personal signif-
icance of those objects and facts. Brave and Nass (2003) also underlined
the object–directedness of emotions, citing Frijda (1994): ‘Emotions are
intentional. They imply and involve relationships with a particular ob-
ject’. Moods, on the other hand, are non–intentional, not object directed
and are experienced as more diffuse, global, and general. Emotion is also
different from moods on a functional level: as a reaction to a stimulus,
emotion can bias a certain action for a short period of time. Moods, in
contrast, bias strategies and processing over longer periods periods of
time (Brave & Nass, 2003). Note that the influence of affect as a reaction
to a relevant stimulus does not need to result from that stimulus per se:
Hoffman (1986) proposed a set of processes, including semantic interpre-
tation, as preparatory transformations that can put a stimulus in a form
that allows affect to operate.
Affect can influence subsequent information processing by initiat-
ing it, terminating it, accelerating it, or disrupting it (Hoffman, 1986); it
can influence global performance (e.g. positive affect facilitates cognitive
flexibility and efficiency in thinking and problem solving, Brave & Nass,
2003), but is also effective in capturing attention, improving memory,
recall, and category accessibility (Hoffman, 1986), and it can result in
mood–congruent and affect–congruent decision making (Brave & Nass,
2003; Klauer & Stern, 1992). Affect can be caused by moods and senti-
ments, by previous emotional states, by specific goals or more abstract
needs (Brave & Nass, 2003), or by judgemental tendencies (Klauer &
Stern, 1992; Wentura, 2000).
2.2.1 Affective compatibility
Given the many global influences that affect can have on cognitive infor-
mation processing, it is not surprising that in the last decade an increasing
number of researchers have been putting much effort in understanding
the cognitive underpinnings of affect. One way to carry out this type of
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research is to establish influences of affect on cold cognition using the
conflict and interference tasks used in SRC research. If the two systems
are separate, non–connecting mechanisms, then no effects of either con-
flicting or non–conflicting information in the affective domain should
be observed in cold cognitive processing. On the other hand, affective
congruency effects (i.e. faster processing of a stimulus–response map-
ping that has equivalent affective valence either within the stimulus or
between the stimulus and the response) or incongruency effects would
indicate an interface between hot and cold cognition.
One of the earliest attempts to investigate this issue was by Fazio,
Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) who created a priming task in
which the relation between prime and target was not based on semantics
or phonetics (e.g. see Neely, 1991) but was based on affective valence.
For instance, the prime–target pair SUMMER–HONEST was considered
to be affectively congruent whereas CANCER–HONEST was considered
affectively incongruent. This affective–congruency effect actually is an
affective–priming effect consisting of the difference in mean response–
time latencies to the affectively incongruent and congruent prime–target
pairs. Fazio et al. (1986) indeed observed an affective priming effect.
This finding has been replicated in many other studies (De Houwer,
Hermans, Rothermund, & Wentura, 2002; De Houwer & Randell, 2004;
Hermans, DeHouwer, & Eelen, 2001; Klauer &Musch, 2001; Moors &De
Houwer, 2001; Wentura, 2000; but see Klauer &Musch, 2001, and Spruyt,
Hermans, Pandelaere, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2004, for some exceptions).
Affective congruency effects in a Stroop taskwere investigated by Rother-
mund and Wentura (1998). De Houwer and Eelen (1998) extended the
spatial Simon task to the domain of affective information processing (see
De Houwer, 2003; De Houwer, Crombez, Baeyens, & Hermans, 2001;
De Houwer & Eelen, 1998; De Houwer, Hermans, & Eelen, 1998; Voß,
Rothermund, &Wentura, 2003). Beckers et al. (2002) used the perception
and action framework from the theory of event–coding (Hommel et al.,
2001) to showan affective response–effect using trained adverse–response
effects to certain responses that in a test phase were compatible or incom-
patible with the affective valence of the stimuli. Lemmens, de Haan, van
Galen, and Meulenbroek (2004b) employed multimodal stimuli carrying
an affective load obtaining a multimodal affective congruency effect in
several studies (e.g. see Van Esch–Bussemakers, 2001; Lemmens et al.,
2001; Lemmens, de Haan, & van Galen, 2004).
In a series of categorisation and naming studies, De Houwer and
2.2. Affective information processing 25
colleagues (De Houwer et al., 2002; De Houwer & Randell, 2004) showed
that the semantic system seemed to be involved in the processing of
affective information. They proposed a distributed model of semantic
memory in which affective valence as well as semantic information are
encoded as distributed patterns of activation across a set of processing
units.
However, formally many of the affective priming studies cannot be
considered stimulus–response compatibility effects because the temporal
order of the (sequential) presentation of prime and target is different from
that of relevant and irrelevant stimuli (that are presented simultaneously).
The usefulness of SRC for affective computing would be better shown
using a task that does fit under the umbrella of SRC. Such a task is the
affective Simon task.
2.2.2 The affective Simon task
In theDO taxonomy of Kornblum et al. (1990), the Simon task is classified
as a Type–3 ensemble that is characterised by an overlap between the
irrelevant stimulus and the response (S i –R ) but no overlap between the
relevant stimulus and response (S r –R ) or the relevant stimulus and the
irrelevant stimulus (S i – S r). The S i –R overlap in Type–3 ensembles is
responsible for the increase in response times when S i is incompatible
with R. For instance, in a spatial Simon task the relevant stimulus feature
is colour that, by instruction, should be translated in lateralized responses
(no overlap possible between colour and location). However, the stimuli
are presented on the left or right of a fixation point, introducing a task–
irrelevant location feature in the stimulus that has a dimensional overlap
with the location feature of the responses; within the stimulus, however,
there still is no overlap of S r and S i.
De Houwer (1998) and DeHouwer and Eelen (1998) observed that the
generalised feature–unspecific setup of overlaps for Type–3 ensembles
did not limit the Simon effect to the spatial domain (also see Kornblum&
Stevens, 2002). DeHouwer (1998) used the Simonparadigm to investigate
task–irrelevant semantic overlap in S i –R whereas De Houwer and Eelen
(1998) used the paradigm to investigate the impact of affective valence
on information processing (also see De Houwer et al., 2001).
The affective Simon task (DeHouwer et al., 2001; DeHouwer & Eelen,
1998) was constructed in a similar fashion as the regular spatial Simon
26 Stimulus–Response Compatibility and Affective Computing
task. Instead of a spatial or semantic feature (De Houwer, 1998), in this
case it was affective valence that created an overlap between S i and R.
Participants were instructed to pronounce the word POSITIVE when
presented with a noun and to pronounce NEGATIVEwhen seeing an ad-
jective. In this case the feature that distinguished the possible responses
was affective valence and the relevant stimulus was grammatical cate-
gory. The dimensional overlap of S i –R was created by using words in
either grammatical category having established affective valences (Her-
mans &DeHouwer, 1994), for instance, FRIEND andHONEST or THIEF
and STUPID. Like the spatial Simon effect, this setup resulted in two
different types of stimuli. For instance, the stimulus FRIEND has a con-
gruent S i –R relation: FRIEND has a task–irrelevant positive affective
valence overlapping with the relevant response feature also having a
positive affective valence. On the other hand, the stimulus THIEF was
considered to be incongruent, because THIEF has a negative affective
valence whereas the appropriate response has positive affective valence.
This way, De Houwer and Eelen (1998) created a paradigm fulfilling
all three criteria of the Type–3 ensembles characterizing the generalized
Simon paradigm: (a) no S r –R overlap (grammatical category vs. affec-
tive valence), (b) no S i – S r overlap (affective valence vs. grammatical
category), and (c) the overlap of affective valence of the stimulus words
and the affective property of the response could result in compatible or
incompatible relations between S i and R. Comparing affectively congru-
ent trials to affectively incongruent trials showed a congruency effect of
around 50ms (De Houwer & Eelen, 1998, Exp. 2).
Extending the paradigm, De Houwer et al. (2001) and Tipples (2001)
found affective–congruency effects for pictorial stimuli using different
types of relevant stimulus attributes (grammatical category and seman-
tic category; also see De Houwer et al., 2001) with response words that
only indirectly carried a positive or negative valence (cf. FLOWER and
CANCER vs. POSITIVE and NEGATIVE, De Houwer et al., 2001, Exper-
iment 3; Tipples, 2001). These findings established the affective Simon
task as a fruitful and useful variant of the Simon paradigm to study the
processing of affective information.
In our view, the setup just described makes the Simon task an ideal
candidate for research in the field of human–factors because it is a well
defined experimental task that mimics real–world circumstances closely.
In real life, more often than not, stimuli carry multiple features of which
only one is strictly relevant for the task to be executed. The other features,
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however, can affect task or response execution because they somehow
share information with the response to be executed without users being
aware of the influence. The Simon task fulfills these criteria because
without explicit notification (which is necessary in Fitts and Seeger’s,
1953, spatial compatibility task) one can manipulate the task–irrelevant
(S i) location or semantics. In order to study affective computing in a
systematic manner one can use affect as S i, in a task (reflecting a specific
S r –R translation) that is affect–unrelated (i.e. at least for the participants).
Findings of spatial compatibility effects have resulted in interface–
layout design guidelines to maintain spatial correspondence. In a sim-
ilar fashion we propose to exploit affective Simon effects for affective–
computing purposes by taking into account more general affective–con-
gruency effects, for instance, when using affectively charged earcons in
human–computer interfaces. In the following section we argue that the
major/minor distinction in Western tonal music can be used to transform
(families of) affect–neutral earcons to variants in major or minor mode
to facilitate or support the presentation of emotionally loaded messages.
These affectively loaded earcons can then be carefully employed in mul-
timodal affective human–computer interfaces.
2.3 The major/minor distinction
Sounds can evoke powerful emotions. Consider, for instance, a loud
bang that will startle us or the shrieking of fingernails on a blackboard
that most people find highly unpleasant. Such sounds often trigger re-
sponses ranging from immediate escape to making every effort to stop
the noise. In emotion research these types of sound are known to elicit
generalised arousal effects, orientation (flight or fight) reactions, and re-
lated emotional responses that are referred to as basic emotions whereas
cognitive emotions (e.g. indignation or desire) follow attributions, that
is, higher cognitive processing (Van Egmond, Desmet, & Van Der Helm,
2004). Within the realm of music processing, an important distinction
related to emotion is that of major mode versus minor mode.
In western tonal music the major mode is presumed to have a default
association of a happy, merry charge, whereas the minor mode is mostly
labeled as sad (Crowder, 1984; Gregory, Worrall, & Sarge, 1996) but also
as dreamy and sentimental (Hevner, 1936). Crowder (1984) described
three possible ideas for explaining why major and happy go together.
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Because (a) the higher partials of major chords can be observed in nature
more often than those of minor chords and the positive connotation is
therefore derived from a greater ‘naturalness’ of a major chord. Alter-
natively, von Helmholtz (1885/1954) hypothesised that (b) major chords
are preferred over minor chords as a special case of a preference of con-
sonance over dissonance.3 Finally, (c) the evaluative connotations can
be a cultural convention that arose by accident. Which of these pro-
posals is the right one still seems to be under debate (Crowder, Reznick,
& Rosenkrantz, 1991, p. 188). However, the emotional connotation of
major and minor is a stable convention that, contrary to initial believes
(Heinlein, 1928), does survive decontextualization (Crowder, 1984) even
for chords presented as briefly as 300ms (Crowder, 1985a, 1985b).
Crowder (1985a) used artificially generated sine–wave major and mi-
nor triads to investigate the sharpness of the categorical distinction ofma-
jor andminor. Creating a nine–step continuum thatmusically skilled and
musically unskilled participants had to judge on perceived majorness,
he showed large interindividual differences with an obvious relation be-
tweenmusical sophistication and the reliability of the categorical discrim-
ination. By comparing Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, Crowder (1985a)
showed that musical skill was merely reflected in the sharpness of the
distinction (i.e. musically unskilled participants were equally proficient
in assigningmajor andminor labels to the extremes of the continuum but
showed greater uncertainty at the centre of the continuum). This finding
was corroborated by Howard, Rosen, and Broad (1992) who also found a
strong positive relationship between musicality and the steepness of the
psychophysical function of each participant for the major–minor contin-
uum. Musically skilled participants showed steeper slopes, reflecting a
sharper distinction between major and minor, than musically unskilled
participants. Crowder explained the interindividual differences mostly
by referring to the artificial nature of the sounds, possibly making the
discrimination hard for most of the subjects. Crowder (1985b) elabo-
rated on these experiments by having participants judge on a happy/sad
dichotomy next to a major/minor categorisation resulting in equivalent
performance for the happy/sad instruction and the major/minor instruc-
tion. Kastner and Crowder (1990) showed that children only three years
old recognized the conventional connotation to a statistically significant
3Related to this proposal was the interesting alternative formulation by Montani
(1945) who claimed that the lowered middle third of a minor triad produced castration
anxiety, mediating the negative connotation of minor chords (cited in Crowder, 1984).
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degree by pointing to happy or grumpy cartoon faces after hearing a
short melody in either major or minor mode. Infants of around 6 months
of age, however, did not show the major/minor distinction when tested
in a gaze–tracking study (Crowder et al., 1991).
In sum, even for musically untrained listeners the major/minor dis-
tinction has the conventional connotation of positive and negative charge,
respectively (Crowder, 1984), even for chords presented very briefly and
without any musical context. With care, these findings suggest that the
positive and negative affective valence of major and minor chords can be
used as a dichotomous variable in experiments investigating the influ-
ence of affect on performance. Lemmens, Bussemakers, and colleagues
(e.g. see Van Esch–Bussemakers, 2001; Lemmens et al., 2000, 2001, 2004b)
have used the major/minor distinction repeatedly to construct earcons
that carried an affective charge, in various studies that involved a sim-
ple picture–categorisation task. They found that the positive affective
valence of the major mode (expressed as, e.g. a C5 triad) resulted in con-
gruent and incongruent dimensional overlap between an earcon in major
mode and positive or negative categorisation responses. For instance,
negative responses to a picture accompanied by an earcon in major mode
(negative response incompatible with positive valence of major mode)
were significantly slower responded to as compared to responses to the
same picture if that picture was accompanied by a minor chord (negative
response compatible with negative valence of minor mode). Lemmens
et al. (2004b) therefore suggested that the major/minor distinction can be
used a basic musical aspect (among others like pitch, timbre, or register;
also see Blattner et al., 1989; Brewster, Wright, & Edwards, 1994; Pramana
& Leung, 1999) to transform affect–neutral earcons into variants in the
major mode (associated with positive affect) or in minor mode (associ-
atedwith negative affect). They suggested that this transformation seems
especially useful for affective–computing research.
2.4 Discussion
To recapitulate, we have shown that the method of pure stage insertion
and deletion by Donders (1868/1969) and its successor the AFM (Stern-
berg, 1969) were successful in determining a sequential set of steps of hu-
man information processing. However, because the statistical premises
of the AFM were violated in typical SRC experiments (Ridderinkhof et
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al., 1995; Sanders, 1998), the AFMwas supplanted by dual–route models
that were proposed, for instance, by Kornblum et al. (1990), de Jong et al.
(1994), and Ridderinkhof (2002).
Kornblum et al. (1990) tried to systematise the many tasks, includ-
ing flanker tasks, Simon tasks, and Stroop tasks, that fitted under the
umbrella of stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) research (Proctor &
Reeve, 1990) by proposing the notion of dimensional overlap and a tax-
onomy of eight types of stimulus–response ensembles. We showed that
SRC has been an important theme in human–factors research primarily
restricted to the spatial layout of interfaces (Andre & Wickens, 1990; Vu
& Proctor, 2003). We argued that SRC research might form a benefi-
cial addition to the direct but complex measures of affect that are em-
ployed in current affective–computing investigations (e.g., Healey et al.,
1998; Scheirer et al., 2002; Ward & Marsden, 2003) and we contend that
affective–compatibility effects are a viable alternative to investigate af-
fective–information processing.
Findings of prolonged response times to incongruent prime–target
pairs and in trials with incongruent S i –R relations in an affective Simon
task all strongly suggest maintaining affective correspondence in HCI
seems as important as maintaining spatial correspondence (also see Lem-
mens et al., 2004b). We discussed affective priming research that hinted a
the involvement of semantic processing in the realisation of many affec-
tive compatibility effects.
Wediscussed that sound can evokepowerful emotions that oftendrive
instinctive reactions: Loud bangs or shrieking noises provoke immediate
avoidance behaviour. On the other hand, the sounds of explosions and
missiles being fired are important aspects of computer gaming that are
often beneficial for performance, so sound does not necessarily hinder
performance (also see the arousal effect, e.g., Keuss, van der Zee, & van
den Bree, 1990). So in some situations adding sound to an interface seems
to enhance performancewhile it hinders performance on other occasions.
It seems important, therefore, to maintain correspondence between the
sound and the event that it accompanies. In some cases this seems trivial
advice, for instance, the action of dropping a bomb in a computer game
should be accompanied with a whistling sound with decreasing pitch.
On the other hand, with pitch as a navigational aid in a tree of menu
options, moving up towards the leaves (the actual menu options that
result in, e.g. a pop–up window when selected) should be accompanied
by decreasing pitch (Walker & Ehrenstein, 2000; Walker, 2002).
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Our own recent research has shown that the major/minor distinction
in Western tonal music is relatively easy way to investigate multimodal
affective–information processing (Lemmens et al., 2001, 2004b) because
the major mode commonly carries a positive emotional load whereas the
minor mode is usually associated with a negative load (Crowder, 1984,
1985a). We propose that the major/minor distinction can be used to trans-
form earcons, with care, into variations capable of presenting positive or
negative emotion. In this way, stimuli or events in an interface that do not
carry an emotional load can be enhanced with auditory accessory stimuli
to add an affective component. For instance, the long lists of emoticons
that can be displayed in many email or online–presence software could
be enhanced with earcons in major and minor mode to more easily dif-
ferentiate between emoticons representing positive or negative emotions,
respectively.
We would like to stress, however, that information processing can be
delayed by the addition of sound, even when correspondence is main-
tained, because in any display the addition of information (whether re-
dundant or complementary) adds a component of distractibility to the
display that can detract attention away from processing the most impor-
tant information. For instance, it is known that in operating–theatres the
alarms of equipment monitoring the health of the patient under surgery
are often shut off because they distract the surgeon (Meredith, Edworthy,
& Rose, 1999; also see Van Egmond, 2004).
Of course, given the young age of the fields of affective computing
and research on affective–compatibility effects, more research is needed
to improve our understanding of the cognitive representation of affect
and how these insights into this domain can be exploited in interface
design. Pending these future research–efforts, we propose, in parallel
with the argument to maintain spatial compatibility in human–computer
interface display designs (Andre & Wickens, 1990; Vu & Proctor, 2003),
that maintaining affective compatibility might be an important first step




Emotionally Charged Earcons Reveal
Affective Congruency Effects†
The most exciting phrase to hear in
science, the one that heralds new
discoveries, is not ‘Eureka!’ but rather
‘hmm....that’s funny...’
Isaac Asimov
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Abstract
The domain of cognitive ergonomics has clearly profited from research
into stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) conducted by experimental
psychologists. In particular, the finding that performance speed is fa-
cilitated under spatially compatible stimulus–response relationships has
found its way into guidelines for how to design an appropriate lay–out
of human–computer interfaces. The search for SRC effects has not been
restricted to spatial dimensions but has also been extended to colour
and sound. In particular, the affective valence of sounds seems relevant
for affective–computing research aimed at investigating how emotions
can be communicated effectively in human–computer interaction. In the
present study we show in a picture–categorisation task that the affective
connotation of earcons in major and minor mode (representing positive
and negative valence, respectively) can be congruent or incongruent with
other task aspects. Our findings show that it is important to carefully in-
vestigate human–computer interfaces for potential affective–congruency
effects because these can either facilitate or inhibit user performance.
†This chapter is submitted as: Lemmens, P. M. C., de Haan, A., van Galen, G. P. ,
& Meulenbroek, R. G. J. (2004). Emotionally Charged Earcons Reveal Affective Congruency
Effects. Manuscript submitted for publication to Ergonomics.
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3.1 Introduction
Research into (stimulus–response) compatibility effects has been a major
topic in human–factors research, for instance, to investigate the optimal
display–arrangements for interface–layouts. Stimulus–response compat-
ibility (SRC) effects refer to findings of improved task performance for
stimulus–response mappings that are more natural (or compatible) com-
pared to less natural (incompatible) mappings (Proctor & Reeve, 1990).
For instance, Fitts and Deininger (1954) instructed one group of partic-
ipants to move a stylus to the left if a light on the 9 o’clock position of
a dial would light up, whereas another group of participants was in-
structed to move the stylus to the right. The latter group experienced a
stimulus–response incompatible mapping and they showed significantly
prolonged response–time latencies because of the spatial incompatibility
between the relative position of the light and the direction of the response.
Originally, much of the research into SRC phenomena involved relatively
simple domains like location or colour (e.g. see Kornblum et al., 1990, for
an overview), but effects of semantic compatibility have been found as
well (e.g. the semantic Simoneffect, DeHouwer, 1998). Recently,many in-
stances of affective–compatibility effects have been reported (De Houwer
& Eelen, 1998; De Houwer et al., 2001, 2002). Such findings suggest that
not only spatial correspondence is important in interface designs, but
that other aspects of human–computer interfaces may also be subject to
effects of stimulus–response compatibility. The affective–compatibility
effects specifically might be relevant for affective–computing research.
Affective–computing research (Picard, 1997) investigates the merits
of incorporating aspects of human emotion into human–computer inter-
faces to improve the quality of human–computer interaction. To do so,
its research efforts are twofold (Hollnagel, 1999). On the one hand, inter-
facesmust be developed that can recognise the current affective state of its
users. These interfaces, on the other hand, should be complemented by
interfaces that can (also) present affectively chargedmessages. Regarding
the first type of interface, already several devices have been developed
that are capable of measuring and exploiting the affective state of their
users. Healey et al. (1998), for instance, created a device that chooses the
music that it will play based on the mood that it infers from measure-
ments of the responses of autonomous–nervous systems (e.g., heart rate
or galvanic skin–conductivity). Research into interfaces that can present
affect, however, seems less prominent. In our view this is unfortunate,
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because especially in this type of interface, where two independent sets
of affect interact—a sender (the computer) versus a sender–perceiver (the
user)— there is ample opportunity for affective incompatibilities to come
about.
In our research on multimodal information processing we have been
investigating the effects of adding redundant sound in human–computer
interfaces. We investigated the effects of earcons (Blattner et al., 1989)
that carry task–irrelevant, redundant information on, for instance, re-
action–time latencies to a task that can be carried out by attending to
the visual modality alone (cf. Lemmens et al., 2001). Because of our
interest in affective–computing research, we developed task–irrelevant
emotionally–charged earcons that carried either a positive or a negative
valence, using the major/minor distinction in Western tonal music (e.g.
see Crowder, 1984, 1985a), to investigate whether affective–congruency
effects are phenomena that researchers in affective computing should take
into account. The present study, therefore, employs a stimulus–response
compatibility paradigm to investigate whether maintaining affective cor-
respondence is important for affective human–computer interfaces.
Earcons are audio messages used in human–computer interfaces to
provide information and feedback. Earcons can include messages, func-
tions, states, and labels (Blattner et al., 1989) and they are designed in
a structured fashion starting by associating simple actions (e.g., “open”)
with simple earcons and by combining elementary actions intomore com-
plex actions (e.g., “open file” or “open folder”) that are associated with
compound earcons. Because of the hierarchical and structured nature of
music, earcons usually are short musical fragments. Using typical mu-
sical transformation–dimensions like pitch, timbre, or rhythm (etc.; see
Gaver, 1989; Pramana&Leung, 1999), elaborate families of earcons can be
constructed that are structurally related to the functions they represent.
A transformation that seems missing in the literature, in our view, is
to transform earcons into a variation in major or minor mode. Crowder
(1984) discussed that musical pieces in major mode are always perceived
as more positive whereas pieces in minor mode are perceived as carrying
a more negative charge. Isolated chords, even when presented as briefly
as 300ms, also contain this stable positive/negative connotation. In the
second study of a series of five, Crowder (1985a) backed these claimswith
empirical evidence. In our view, his evidence shows that the difference in
affective appreciation of the major and minor mode can be incorporated
in the set of transformations for earcons. Themajor/minor transformation
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can then be used specifically to create affectively–charged earcons for use
in affective human–computer interfaces.
Using this distinction between major and minor mode, we were able
to convert our multimodal picture–categorisation task from a task that
originally contained only one affective aspect into a variation containing
two affective features. We expected that the introduction of this addi-
tional affective component would lead to affective–congruency effects,
because the newly added affective valence of the earcons could relate to
the affective valence of the responses —participants had to respond us-
ing positively or negatively valenced Yes– or No–response buttons. The
pattern that we expected was based on the dimensional overlap, which is
the (degree of) similarity of a stimulus and response feature (Kornblum
et al., 1990), between the affective valence of the earcons and that of the
responses that participants had to execute. For instance, we expected
that participants would be faster executing a positive response to trials
that contained an earcon in major mode compared to trials (requiring a
positive response)with an earcon inminormode, because the former trial
has a more natural relation between the affective aspects of stimulus and
response compared to the latter trial. The relationship betweenmajor and
minor earcons and the response categories Yes versus No presumed here
presupposes a positive valence associated with Yes–responses and a neg-
ative valence associated with No–responses. Of course, this relationship
may be questioned and said to be highly task–dependent. The response
“No” to the question of whether one has cancer or not, for example, will
certainly have a positive valence. In the present context and tasks exam-
ined, however, care was taken that Yes– and No–responses were linked
to positive and negative valences, respectively. Therefore, we called the
former type of trials congruent whereas the latter type was called incon-
gruent. The expectations for trials requiring a negative response were
similar. A negative response to a trial with an earcon in minor mode
was congruent and therefore expected to show shorter response–time la-
tencies than negative responses to a trial with an earcon in major mode
(which was incongruent).
3.2 Method
We used an affective animate/inanimate decision of line–drawings of
animals andmusical instruments by instructing participants to press Yes–
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and No–buttons in response to the question “Is the picture you see that
of an animal? Yes/no”. This way, pictures of animals were (implicitly)
associated with “yes” responses.
Weused a taskmanipulation to balance thedesignof the experiment to
ensure that participants executed positive (yes) responses to the pictures
of the animals inonepart of the experiment aswell aspositive responses to
the pictures of the musical instruments in another part. For instance, one
instruction had an examplewhich simply confirmed the abovementioned
question of the instruction (“. . . For instance, if you see a rabbit, press the
button with the label ‘Yes’ . . . ”). The other instruction reversed this
response–to–stimulus assignment: “. . . For instance, if you see a rabbit,
press the button with the label ‘No’ . . . ”. Essentially, in this condition we
forced participants to provide a wrong answer to the question.
3.2.1 Participants
Twelve psychology students took part in the experiment for either € 3,–
or for partial fulfilment of course requirements. Their mean age was 23.1
years; three participants were male.
3.2.2 Materials, Stimuli & Design
Because of the multimodal aspect of the experiments both auditory and
visual stimuli were employed. The auditory stimuli were the earcons in
major and minor mode which were C4 and C5 major and minor triads in
root position (see Crowder, 1985a) with a duration of 2500ms, that were
created by a professional sound–designer using a Roland midi module.
The visual stimuli consisted of sixteen black and white line–drawings of
animate and inanimate objects (see Fig. 3.1). The animate objects were
limited to animals: a squirrel, a butterfly, a cat, a dog, a lion, a bird, a
cow, and a frog. The inanimate objects (limited to musical instruments)
comprised a violin, a trumpet, a drum, a saxophone, a guitar, a flute, an
accordion, and a harp. Care was taken to ensure that all pictures were
approximately of the same size when displayed on the experimental
equipment.
The experiment was carried out on a Macintosh PowerMac G3 that
was equipped with a 17 in. screen. A button box attached to the experi-
mental computer was used to accurately synchronise the presentation of
the visual and auditory stimuli, and to register response–time latencies.
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Figure 3.1: Example pictures that we used in the present study. Note that the same
pictures were also used in the other studies reported in this thesis that used the category
of animals and musical instruments.
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One button was labelled “yes” and another button was labelled “no”
(the actual labels were in Dutch); the order of the labelling was coun-
terbalanced between subjects to prevent effects of preferred hand and to
prevent a confound due to a possible natural tendency to assign affirma-
tive responses to the right hand (Wentura, 2000). Simple stereophonic–
headphones were used to present the earcons (although no stereophonic
effects were used).
The experiment employed a blocked within–subjects design with the
factors Compatibility and Picture category. The design incorporated four
conditions that were different with regard to the fixed relation between
the affective valence of the earcons and the affective property of the re-
sponse within a trial block (see Table 3.1). One trial block reflected an
affect–congruent relation: all pictures of animals, requiring a “yes” re-
sponse, with the sound of the C5 major chord, and all pictures of the
musical instruments combined with the C5 minor chord; another trial
block implemented the affect–incongruent relation (the pictures of ani-
mals with the minor chord and pictures of the musical instruments with
the major chord). The remaining two blocks implemented a condition in
which both categories of pictures were accompanied by the same sound
(called affectively neutral). These neutral blocks were included as control
conditions. Note that Table 3.1 also shows that we always called the com-
bination ofmajor earcons andpositive responses (aswell asminor earcons
and negative responses) congruent whereas combinations of minor and
positive (or major and negative) were always called incongruent.
The task manipulation ensured that the experimental design was bal-
anced with respect to the assignment of responses (yes or no) to the two
categories of (visual) stimuli (animals or musical instruments). Each of
the four trial blocks was carried out once in each response–to–stimulus
assignment. This resulted in 8 experimental blocks: Four trial blocks for
the Animal−→Yes response assignment and another four for the musical
Instruments−→Yes assignment. Half of the participants started with the
Instrument−→Yes task and then carried out the other assignment; the
other half started with Animals−→Yes.
Each trial block contained 32 stimuli: 16 stimuli in the above indicated
picture–sound combinations and 16 without sound to create a baseline
condition (see Table 3.1). The total number of trials therefore amounted to
32 trials × 4 blocks × 2 tasks = 256 trials. Within a block the stimuli were
randomised differently for each stimulus list. The presentation order of
the blocks over participants was according to a digram–balanced Latin
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Table 3.1: Visualisation of the design of the experiment. The various combinations of
pictures and types of sound are presented for both tasks.
Task: Animal −→ Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animal major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Instrument minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Task: Instrument −→ Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animal major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Instrument minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Note. Sound type represents the major/minor distinction used to create the earcons in
major and minor mode, but also includes the no–sound baseline trials (n = 16) within
a trial block (n = 32). Numbers in parentheses represent the number of trials. The trial
blocks marked in bold comprised the congruent condition whereas italics indicates trial
blocks that were called incongruent.
square.
3.2.3 Procedure
Participants were instructed to press buttons according to a question
that was posed before commencing the experiment. For both tasks the
question was “Is the picture you see that of an animal?”. However,
for the Instruments−→Yes assignment, participants were instructed to
press the “no” button to pictures of animals and the “yes” button upon
presentation of a musical instrument using examples in the written and
verbal instruction. Participants were instructed to do this quickly and
accurately; they were not explicitly instructed to ignore the sounds, but
neither were they encouraged to relate the sounds to the pictures they
would see or to the responses they would make. Participants could
practice on sixteen trials randomly drawn from the set of experimental
trials.
The presentation of a single trial started with the presentation of a
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fixation cross for 500ms (plus an alert beep). After a 500ms pause, the
visual and auditory stimuli were presented simultaneously. The visual
stimulus was presented for 300ms. The maximal response–time was
set at 2500ms. The inter–trial interval was set at 1000ms. The entire
experimental session had a duration of approximately 25 minutes.
3.3 Results
Before data analysis, response omissions and errors were pruned from
the raw data. The number of trials removed amounted to 2% of the total
number of trials of both tasks. Because of the small number of errors
committed and because the number of errors did not differ between the
two instructions, no error analysis was carried out. Because only the
data from the congruent and incongruent blocks were of interest for the
current study, the data from the affectively–neutral blocks were not used
in the following statistical analysis; in a similar fashion the baseline trials






















Figure 3.2: Mean response–time latencies
(ms) of the overall analysis of Congruency
and Picture category. RT’s and SE’s (in
parentheses) at the bottom of each bar.
A repeated measures ANOVA
was carried out with Picture cat-
egory (animal or instrument) and
Compatibility (affectively compat-
ible or affectively incongruent) as
within–subject factors. Means and
standard errors are presented in
Figure 3.2.
The analysis showed that par-
ticipants were significantly faster
when they responded to pictures
of animals (444ms) than when
they responsed to musical instru-
ments (504ms; F(1, 11) = 13.529,
MSE = 3182.2, p = .004). Themain
effect for Compatibility was sig-
nificant (F(1, 11) = 7.388, MSE =
2175.2, p = .020). Participants re-
sponded, on average, 36ms faster
to incongruent trials than to con-
gruent trials (456ms and 492ms, respectively).
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The interaction Picture category × Compatibility (F(1, 11) = 8.322,
MSE = 301.9, p = .015) showed that the difference between the congruent
and incongruent conditionwas significantly larger for themusical instru-
ments (51ms) compared to the same difference for the animal pictures
(22ms). That congruency effect proved to be significant for the musical
instruments only (F(1, 11) = 10.520,MSE = 2974.5, p = .008).
We also carried out a post–hoc analysis to investigate how the some-
what awkward Instruments−→Yes instruction affected performance. To
do so, we decided to incorporate the different response–to–stimulus as-
signments as a factor Task (Animals−→Yes or Instruments−→Yes) in the
analysis design Task × Picture category × Compatibility (see Table 3.2).
A repeated measures ANOVA showed that participants were marginally
faster in the Animals−→Yes task (445ms) than in the Instruments−→Yes
task (504ms; F(1, 11) = 4.517,MSE = 18579, p = .057) but all interactions
involving Task were not significant.
3.4 Discussion
Stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) phenomena have provided im-
portant insights for human–factors research, for instance concerning the
spatial layout of interfaces (Vu & Proctor, 2003). Findings of semantic–
and affective–compatibility effects (De Houwer, 1998; De Houwer & Ee-
len, 1998) seem to suggest that also on those levels of interface design, it
is important to maintain correspondence to ensure optimal performance.
Affective–compatibility effects are especially relevant for affective–com-
puting research (Picard, 1997) but, to our knowledge, have not yet been
investigated. We therefore carried out an experiment in which the au-
ditory components (i.e., earcons) in a multimodal picture–categorisation
task, that already employed affectively–charged positive and negative
responses, were enriched with positively– or negatively–valenced affect.
Based on the literature on affective–compatibility effects (e.g., DeHouwer
et al., 2001; De Houwer & Eelen, 1998), we expected that during informa-
tion processing the relation between the affective charge of the auditory
component of the stimulus and the affective valence of the responses
would result in affective–congruency effects.
The results show a multimodal affective–congruency effect: Partic-
ipants were significantly faster responding to certain combinations of
affective valence of the earcons and affective valence of the responses. In
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Table 3.2: Mean response–time latencies (ms) for the congruent and incongruent con-
ditions for each picture category from each instruction with the data from the baseline
condition included. Standard errors in parentheses.




Congruency With earcon Without earcon With earcon Without earcon
Congruent 433 (32) 432 (26) 495 (40) 458 (29)
Incongruent 412 (20) 413 (25) 440 (21) 428 (24)
Task: Instrument−→Yes
Instrument Animal
Congruency With earcon Without earcon With earcon Without earcon
Congruent 564 (55) 453 (33) 478 (45) 502 (43)
Incongruent 517 (48) 474 (35) 455 (34) 442 (35)
Note. The data presented on one row represent the data acquired in one trial block. The
columnWithout earcon presents the data of the baseline trials without sound. Note that
the picture category assigned the Yes–response is always presented first. Congruency is
determined by the dimensional overlap between the affective valence of the responses
and the major or minor earcons. This implies that in the Animal−→Yes task, in the
congruent condition, the pictures of the animals were presented together with an earcon
in major mode (also see Table 3.1). Also note that in the Instrument−→Yes task, the data
for the instrument pictures are presented first.
this experiment, the advantageous combinations were positive responses
to trials with earcons inminormode and negative responses to trials with
earcons inmajor mode. Compared to our original expectations, however,
this congruency effect shows a processing advantage for the less natural,
incongruent trial types. If we assume that the positive response with an
earcon in major mode (or a negative response with an earcon in minor
mode) still is the more natural, congruent combination, then we must
conclude that our participants interpreted the task and stimuli in a way
that we did not anticipate.
We consider two potential explanations for the reversal of the congru-
ency effect. Observe that the largest congruency effect was observed for
the subset of data from the instrument pictures in the Instrument−→Yes
part. Considering the relative size of the effect in that subset of data
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compared to the effect in the other three subsets (see Table 3.2), the over-
all affective–congruency effect may have been overestimated due to the
relatively large impact of the congruency effect of the instruments in the
Instruments−→YES part. Our first explanation relates to the presumed
association between positive valence and Yes–responses and negative
affective–valence and No–responses. Our request to execute the wrong
response (relative to the implied answer to the question “Is it an animal?”)
in the Instrument−→Yes part of the experiment may have uncoupled or
even reversed the presumed association. That is, despite the fact that
participants had to execute a No–response to the picture of an animal,
this No–response may still have carried positive affect because of the
implied positive response to the question posed in the instruction. This
effect, secondly, may have been complicated further by the fact that par-
ticipants may have relied on a stronger relationship between the pictures
of the musical instruments and the earcons in major and minor mode,
compared to that of the animals and the earcons, because the instrument
pictures and earcons both have a musical character.
We also obtained an effect of Picture category representing a process-
ing advantage of pictures of animals over the pictures of the musical
instruments. In our view this processing advantage is similar to the ani-
macy effect that von Studnitz and Green (2002) obtained in a language–
switching task using the animate/inanimate distinction (see de Groot,
1990; Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004). The animacy effect refers to a simple
processing advantage for biological living things, who’s origin may lie in
evolutionary benefits for animate objects (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998).
The findings carry two important messages for affective–computing
research and human–factors research in general. The first message re-
lates strongest to affective computing and is that affective–compatibility
effects can cause performance decrements in affective human–computer
interfaces that do not maintain affective correspondence between signals
or events. The second message is that, for human–factors research, it
is sometimes difficult to predict the strategy that participants formulate
(often covertly) to carry out a task that they are given. The present results
show that such effects of strategy can already be important in laboratory





Effects: The Role of Judgemental
Tendencies†
“...It is a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma.”
Sir Winston Churchill (1874–1965)
radio talk, October 1st, 1939
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Abstract
This study aimed to investigate whether affective–compatibility effects
that are reported in studies using visual linguistic stimuli could be repli-
cated in a study ofmultimodal interference–effects involving audiovisual
stimuli. To this end, we exploited in a picture–categorization task, in
which participants were asked to discriminate between pictures of ani-
mals and inanimate objects, the affective connotations of the major and
minor mode that exist in Western tonal music. The latter, task–irrelevant
information accompanied the presentation of the pictures. A mixed be-
tween andwithin–groupdesignwasused in an attempt to capture the role
of judgemental tendencies. The results show that the predicted affective–
congruency effects were only present in the participant group answering
a positive question (”Is this picture an animal?”). These effects were,
however, reversed in the group answering a negative question (”Is this
picture not an animal?”). Collectively, the results provide evidence for
the involvement of judgemental tendencies as an important determinant
of multimodal affective–congruency effects. We discuss the relevance
of the present findings for the cognitive–ergonomic domain of affective
computing.
†This chapter is based on the manuscript submitted as Lemmens, P. M. C., de Haan,
A., and van Galen, G. P. (2004). Multimodal Affective–Congruency Effects: The Role of
Judgemental Tendencies. Manuscript submitted for publication to Acta Psychologica.
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4.1 Introduction
Research into congruency, correspondence, or, in general, compatibility
effects has clearly demonstrated benefits for situations in which stimulus
and response elements agree with a strong population stereotype (see
Fitts & Deininger, 1954 and Fitts & Seeger, 1953). The majority of studies
on stimulus–response compatibility (SRC) phenomena have been limited
to relatively simple stimulusdimensions like location and color (Proctor&
Reeve, 1990). Recently, however, researchers have taken up the challenge
to investigate the effects of emotion and affect on task performance in an
attempt to try and elucidate the representation of affect in human cogni-
tion. Because measuring affect directly is a rather complicatedmatter (in-
volving measurements of the responses of the autonomous–nervous sys-
tem, e.g., EEG, EMG, or the galvanic skin–response), or, when using ques-
tionnaires, is subject to personal interpretations of the participants, these
researchers have turned to the indirect–measurementmethods employed
in SRC paradigms. They obtained, for example, affective Simon–effects
(e.g., DeHouwer et al., 2001; DeHouwer&Eelen, 1998; Tipples, 2001; Voß
et al., 2003) but affective Stroop–effects (Rothermund & Wentura, 1998)
could not be found. There have also been several reports of affective–
priming effects (e.g., De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Klauer &Musch, 2001;
Moors & De Houwer, 2001; Wentura, 2000). Although strictly speak-
ing the priming paradigm is not an SRC paradigm, the effects that were
found typify the more general class of affective–compatibility effects (e.g.
see Kornblum et al., 1990).
One aspect that seems to be missing in the literature on (general)
affective–compatibility effects, to our knowledge, is information on mul-
timodal affective–congruency effects (see Schriefers & Meyer, 1990, for a
similar question regarding picture–word interference effects). Currently,
most studies employ visually presented words that are both prime and
target and each contain affective valence. In a multimodal variation of
such a task, the task–relevant stimuli are presented, for instance, visu-
ally, whereas the task–irrelevant affective valence is presented auditorily.
Our notion of multimodality, therefore, refers to a multimodal (auditory–
visual) stimuluspresentation andnot to the cross–modal or intermodaldi-
mensional overlap between the visually presented task–irrelevant stimu-
lus feature andmanually–executed response in, for instance, the affective
Simon effect. Finding cross–modal interference effects in such a paradigm
would not only corroborate existing evidence for affective–compatibility
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effects, but would also show that affectively–charged auditory material
can interact with semantic information–processing. The latter is com-
monly assumed to mediate the processing of affective information (De
Houwer & Randell, 2004; but see Wentura, 2000). The present study
therefore used the affective connotation of the major/minor distinction in
Western tonal music (Crowder, 1984; Gregory et al., 1996; Pittenger, 2003)
to add an auditory component to a picture–categorization task in which
participants had to discriminate between pictures of animals and inan-
imate objects. As in other affective–compatibility studies, the auditory
affective–component (which we will refer to as auditory flankers in the
present study) constitutes a task–irrelevant stimulus feature which will
either correspond to or be in conflict with the affective property of the
simple button–press responses that represented ’Yes’– and ’No’–answers
to the question that was posed to the participants at the start of the ex-
periment. In particular, in the present study, we exploited the affective
connotation of the major and minor modes, which in Western music are
known to be associated with positive and negative affect, respectively.
Our key prediction that a dimensional overlap (Kornblum et al., 1990)
between the affective connotation of the major/minor chord distinction
and the affective property of the responses that we asked our partici-
pants to generate, namely Yes– versus No–responses (see below), would
systematically affect picture–categorization task performance, is based
on two assumptions. The first assumption concerns the presumed affec-
tive connotation of the major/minor chord distinction. Crowder (1984)
showed that the association of a positive mood, affective valence, and
appreciation of musical works written in major mode and of a negative
affective valence of music written in minor mode is a stable convention
that musically–skilled as well as unskilled people recognize (Crowder,
1985b). In another study it was shown that children with an age of four
years or older already attribute this conventional connotation to themajor
andminor modes (Kastner & Crowder, 1990), although infants of around
6 months of age do not yet seem to have acquired this association (Crow-
der et al., 1991). The distinction is present for chords that are presented
in isolation and even when presented very briefly (Crowder, 1985a). Pit-
tenger (2003) has recently confirmed (and extended) these findings. This
evidence supports our assumption that chords in major mode are associ-
ated with positive affective–valence and that chords in minor mode are
associated with negative valence and we expected that our participant
group, that is, university students who usually have had (minimal) mu-
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sical education and who regularly listen to Western tonal music, should
be sufficiently sensitive to and appreciative of the emotional valence of
isolated chords in major or minor mode (cf. Crowder, 1985a; Pittenger,
2003).
The second assumption on which we based our prediction that the
dimensional overlap between the auditory flankers and the responses
would affect performance of a picture–categorization task concerns the
affective property of the Yes/No responses. We decided to use the Yes– or
No–responses instead of the more common pronounciation of POSITIVE
or NEGATIVE to add another response dimension to the aforementioned
one and the previously employed response pairs of FLOWER/CANCER,
NICE/NASTY, and COMEDY/CANCER (Tipples, 2001). To be able to
determine what the more natural, congruent combinations of affective
valence of the auditory flankers and that of the responses would be,
we presupposed that Yes–responses are associated with positive valence
and that No–responses are associated with negative valence. Of course,
this relationship may be questioned and can be highly task–dependent.
The response “No” to the question of whether one has cancer, for exam-
ple, will certainly have a positive valence. Indeed, in a lexical–decision
task a group of participants that Wentura (2000) instructed to respond
with negative responses to word targets and positive responses to non-
words showed a reversed congruency effect (i.e., themean response–time
latency for the congruent condition was longer than that of the incongru-
ent condition). In other words, Wentura (2000) found that his group of
participants was slower to respond to a prime–target pair like SUMMER–
HONEST despite the fact that this pair was affectively congruent. In his
study, Wentura related his findings to the judgemental–tendency model
proposed by Klauer and Stern (1992) in which the direction of affective–
congruency effects is presumed to depend on the response assignment.
Wewill return to thismodel–based interpretation of affective–congruency
effects in the discussion section.
Based on these assumptions we examined in a picture–categorization
task the performance of an affectively–congruent condition consisting of
combinations of positive responses on the one hand and task–irrelevant
chords in major mode on the other because they both have a positive va-
lence. The same applied, of course, to combinations of minor chords and
negative responses both having negative valence that were, therefore,
included in the affectively–congruent condition as well. The affectively–
incongruent condition comprised the opposite combinations: positive
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responses with minor chords and negative responses with major chords.
We expected that participants would show shorter response times in the
congruent condition of our picture–categorization task, in which they
had to execute positive responses to pictures of animals and negative
responses to pictures of inanimate objects by answering the question “Is
the picture you see that of an animal?”. Compared to the congruent con-
dition, we expected that participants would show longer response–time
latencies in the incongruent condition. We included a control condi-
tion, to complete the design, in which another group of participants was
instructed to execute negative responses to the pictures of the animate
objects. This group of participants was asked to answer the question “Is




Thirty–eight students (10 males) in psychology or cognitive science vol-
unteered to participate in the experiment (mean age 23.5 years). They
received € 4.50 or took part in the experiment for partial fulfillment of
course requirements.
4.2.2 Materials, Stimuli & Design
Because of the multimodal aspect of the experiment both auditory and
visual stimuli were employed. The auditory stimuli were C4 and C5 ma-
jor andminor triads in root position with a duration of 2500ms, that were
created by a professional sound–designer using a Roland midi module.
The visual stimuli consisted of 16 black and white line–drawings of ani-
mals and inanimate objects. The animate objects depictedwere a squirrel,
a butterfly, a cat, a dog, a lion, a bird, a cow, and a frog. The inanimate
objects comprised a shoe, a bed, a balloon, a candle, a violin, a loaf of
bread, a boat, and an airplane (see Fig. 4.1). These pictures were selected
from two sets of pictures (of animals and inanimate objects) for which
the mean affective rating, determined in a separate study with a different
group of participants, did not differ statistically (t(23) = 1.284, ns). Care
was taken to ensure that all pictures were of approximately the same size
when displayed on the experimental equipment.
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Figure 4.1: Two example pictures from the set of inanimate objects that we used in
the present study. The pictures of animals were the same ones used in Chapter 3 (see
Fig. 3.1).
The experiment was carried out on a Macintosh PowerMac G3 that
was equipped with a 17 in. screen. A button box attached to the exper-
imental computer was used to accurately synchronize the presentation
of the visual and auditory stimuli and to register response–time laten-
cies. One button was labeled “yes” and another button was labeled
“no” (the actual labels were in Dutch); the order of the labeling was
counterbalanced between subjects to prevent effects of preferred hand
and to prevent a confound due to a possible natural tendency to as-
sign affirmative responses to the right hand (Wentura, 2000). Simple
stereophonic–headphones were used to present the auditory stimuli (al-
though no stereophonic effects were used).
To balance response to stimulus–category assignments, we employed
a between–subjects factor Task. Participants instructed to respond with
Yes–responses to pictures of animals carried out the Animate–task and
participants assigned to the group instructed to respond Yes to pictures
of the inanimate objects carried out the Inanimate–task. For both groups
each participant worked through the same within–subjects design (see
Table 4.1) containing twelve trial blocks incorporating the factors Picture
category (Animate or Inanimate) and Congruency (Affectively congruent
or incongruent). The trial blocks were constructed using the following
procedure that created two different sets of four trial blocks and another
two sets of two trial blocks.
Individual trial blocks contained 32 stimuli: 8 pictures of animate
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Table 4.1: Visualization of the design of the experiment. For each group of participants
the various combinations of pictures and types of sound are presented.
Task: Animate −→Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animate major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Inanimate minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Repetitions 4 4 2 2
Task: Inanimate −→Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animate major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Inanimate minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Repetitions 4 4 2 2
Note. Sound type represents themajor andminor auditory flankers, but also includes the
no–sound baseline trials (n = 16) within a trial block (n = 32). Numbers in parentheses
represent the number of trials. The two leftmost trial blocks were each replicated four
timeswhereas the two rightmost trial blocks were each replicated twice. The trial blocks
marked in bold are called congruent trial blocks whereas italics indicates trial blocks
that are called incongruent.
objects and 8 of inanimate objects in the indicated picture–sound combi-
nations (see Table 4.1) and the same 16 pictures without sound to create a
baseline condition and to prevent participants from exploiting the fixed
relation between picture and sound present in the congruent and incon-
gruent trial blocks. Given a set of twelve different trial blocks, the total
number of trials amounted to 32 trials × 12 blocks = 384 trials per ex-
periment. Within a trial block the stimuli were randomized differently
for each stimulus list. The presentation order of the trial blocks over
participants was according to a Latin square.
4.2.3 Procedure
Participants were instructed to press one of two buttons to answer a ques-
tion that was posed at the start of the experiment. Participants who were
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(randomly) assigned to the Animate–task were instructed to answer the
question “Is the picture you see that of an animal?” by pressing a button
labeled “yes” or “no” which implicitly associated positive responses to
pictures of animals. Participants that were (randomly) assigned to the
Inanimate–task were instructed to answer the question “Is the picture
you see not that of an animal?”. This question implicitly associated neg-
ative responses to pictures of animals. Participants were instructed to do
this quickly and accurately; they were not explicitly instructed to ignore
the sounds, but neither were they encouraged to relate the sounds to the
pictures theywould see and the responses theywouldmake. Participants
could practice on ten trials randomly drawn from the set of experimental
trials.
The presentation of a single trial started with the presentation of a
fixation cross for 500ms (plus an alert beep). After a 1000ms pause, the
visual and auditory stimuli were presented simultaneously. The visual
stimulus was presented for 300ms. The maximal response–time was
set at 2500ms. The inter–trial interval was set at 1500ms. The entire
experimental session had a duration of approximately 35 minutes.
4.3 Results
Before the statistical analyses the datawere pruned from errors and omis-
sions. The repeated–measures ANOVAon Task (between–subjects factor;
Animate–task or Inanimate–task), Picture category (Animate or Inani-
mate), and Congruency (Affectively congruent or Affectively incongru-
ent) was, therefore, carried out on the correct trials only. Besides an
ANOVA by subjects (computing averages for 38 subjects over the 16 dif-
ferent pictures), we carried out an item analysis (computing averages
for 16 items over 38 subjects). In this analysis, Picture category was a
between–subjects variable. The ANOVA by subjects is reported as F1 (or
t1) and the item analyses are reported as F2 (or t2).
4.3.1 Errors
The errors comprised only 1.2% of all available data points. A repeated
measures ANOVA on error percentages from the data of the congruent
and incongruent trial blocks only showed that participants committed
more errors in the Inanimate– than the Animate–task (i.e., 8.2% and 1.3%,
respectively; F(1, 36) = 44.672, p < 0.001). This effect, however, did not
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interact with effects of Picture category or Congruency. The latter factors
did not show main effects on error percentages.
4.3.2 Reaction time
The mean response–time latencies (and associated standard errors) are
presented in Figure 4.2. Contrary to our expectation, we did not find
a main effect of Congruency. Pooled across the two participant groups,
the mean RT’s were 427ms and 428ms for the affectively–congruent and
incongruent conditions, respectively (F1 < 1; F2(1, 28) = 1.796, ns).
However, we did obtain an interaction between Congruency and Task
(F1(1, 36) = 11.615, p < 0.01; F2(1, 28) = 14.144, p < 0.001). This in-
teraction showed that participants in the Animate–task responded, as
expected, faster to the congruent condition (430ms) than to the incon-
gruent condition (444ms; F1(1, 36) = 7.254, p < 0.05; t2(15) = −3.394,
p < 0.01). Participants in the Inanimate–task showed theoppositepattern.
The −13ms difference between the congruent and incongruent condition
(425ms and 412ms, respectively) was significant in the subject analysis
and proved to be a weak trend in the item analysis (F1(1, 36) = 4.671,
p < 0.05; t2(15) = 1.873, p = 0.081).
We found that participants responded significantly faster to the pic-
tures of animals than to the pictures of inanimate objects (410ms and
445ms, respectively; F1(1, 36) = 75.562, p < 0.001; F2(1, 28) = 63.240,
p < .001). For Picture category we did not find an interaction with
Task or with Congruency (F1’s < 1; F2’s < 1). The three–way interac-
tion Task × Picture category × Congruency was not significant (F1 < 1;
F2(1, 28) = 1.207, ns). The results showed that the two task variationswere
not different with respect to response–time latencies (F1(1, 36) = 1.436, ns;
F2(1, 28) = 15.381, p < 0.001).
4.4 Discussion
This study was carried out to investigate whether affective–compatibility
effects that are reported in the literature (e.g., DeHouwer et al., 2001, 2002)
can be replicated in amultimodal version of a picture–categorization task.
To do so we used the connotation that exists in Western tonal music that
associates the major mode with positive affective–valence and the minor























































































































































Figure 4.2: Mean response–time latencies (ms) for the congruent and incongruent con-
ditions for animate and inanimate pictures with the baseline (silent) condition included.
RT’s and SE’s (in parentheses) at the bottom of each bar. The pairs of black or gray and
white bars reflect overall means of data points from the same condition. For instance,
the black and white bars in the left panel for the animate objects reflect the means of
the congruent condition and the associated baseline trials from the same condition (see
Table 4.1). The directly neighboring gray and white pair reflects the data points from
the incongruent condition. The picture categories are ordered according to the Yes– and
No–response assignments: In each panel the picture category on the left was assigned
the Yes–response. S indicates stimulus category; R indicates the instructed response.
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a dimensional overlap between this affective connotation1 and the affec-
tive properties of the responses that participants had to execute. Finding
differences in response–time latencies to the congruent and incongru-
ent conditions would be an interesting addition to the existing literature
which, to date, has only provided evidence for affective–compatibility
effects in the visual modality. A multimodal affective–congruency effect
involving the auditorymodalitywould also demonstrate that affective in-
formation presented in this modality is processed in the semantic system
which has been proposed to mediate the processing of affective informa-
tion (De Houwer & Randell, 2004).
The results of the present experiment were quite ambiguous. To our
surprise, we did not find an overall difference between the affectively
congruent and incongruent conditions. However, we did obtain an inter-
action of Congruency and Task that demonstrated that the participants
carrying out the Animate–task showed the predicted congruency effect
(i.e., shorter RT’s to the congruent condition and longer RT’s to the incon-
gruent condition) whereas the participants in the Inanimate–task showed
a reversed congruency effect with longer RT’s to the congruent condition
and shorter RT’s to the incongruent condition. It seemed as if some aspect
of the Inanimate–task completely reversed the pattern of overlap between
the affective valence of the auditory flankers and the affective property
of the responses. Initially we reconsidered the affective charge of the
visual targets. Although the mean affective charge of the (super)sets of
the visual targets did not differ significantly, the ratings for some pictures
employed in the present study were relatively high. The affective charge
of these pictures, however, did not modulate ourmain finding of the Task
× Congruency interaction as is explained in Appendix 4.B.
Comparing a spreading–activation account and a judgemental–ten-
dency model (Klauer & Stern, 1992) of affective priming, Wentura (2000)
found a similar second–order interaction between the manipulation of
the response assignments and the congruency manipulation in his study
of the affective–priming effect. He took this interaction as evidence for
the involvement of judgemental tendencies in the affective–priming ef-
fect, because of the spreading–activation account and the judgemental–
1Note that, despite converging evidence, obtained by Crowder (1985a, 1985b), Gre-
gory et al. (1996), and Pittenger (2003), on the positive and negative affective charge
of the major and minor mode, respectively, we carried out a rating study (see Ap-
pendix 4.A) investigating the affective charge of the auditory flankers thatwe employed.
In brief, this study confirmed our assumptions.
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tendencymodel only the latter predicts that response assignments are im-
portant in determining which conditions are affectively–congruent and
which conditions are affectively–incongruent.
The judgemental–tendency theory by Klauer and Stern (1992), that
was proposed to understand how attitudes guide memory–based judge-
ments, revolves around a 3–step process2 proposing that, first, the affec-
tive features of stimuli are automatically extracted and evaluated. If there
happen to be two affective features, both are extracted and their congru-
ency is evaluated. In the second step, the evaluation results in an affirma-
tive response–tendency if the stimulus features are affectively congruent
and a tendency to reject the relation if it is incongruent. For instance, for
the prime–target pair SUMMER–HONEST the affective charges are con-
gruent, and the response–tendencywould be to confirm this relationship.
For the pair SUMMER–THIEF, on the other hand, the response tendency
would be to reject the relation. In a controlled process, the third step,
this tendency is then verified as being appropriate or inappropriate in
relation to the instructed response.
It is this step that generates the predictions concerning the interaction
of congruency and response assignment. If, for instance, participants are
instructed to execute a negative response to a certain target, say, nega-
tive responses to nouns, this negative response is congruent (and thus
shorter RT’s are expected) with a prevailing response–tendency to re-
ject the affectively incongruent prime–target pair SUMMER–THIEF. Note
that this procedure of comparing a response tendency and the instructed
response is similar to the logical–recoding model for SRC effects that was
proposed by Hedge and Marsh (1975). In this model, the same recoding
rule (‘identity’ or ‘reversal’) is applied to both stimulus features (S r and
S i ; Lu & Proctor, 1995). Faster responses are expected when the rules
for the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions are equivalent (i.e.,
either identity or reversal) compared to a stimulus for which the rules are
different (identity vs. reversal, or v.v.). Hedge and Marsh (1975) favored
a horse–race model to account for the differences in response–time laten-
cies. This model was formalized by de Jong et al. (1994) and extended by
Ridderinkhof (2002).
Although our study and that byWentura (2000) employ different tasks
2Klauer and Stern (1992) did not incorporate the automatic extraction and evaluation
of the affective informationas a separate step in the logic of theirmodel, as the title of their
paper shows. Wentura (2000) mentions the stage of extracting the affective information
as the additional step.
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and a different (temporal) order of presentation of prime/flanker and tar-
get, the studies also have some similarities. Both experiments employed
an emphasis on a particular category of stimuli and both studies ma-
nipulated the response assignment to that category. For these reasons
and the comparable pattern of results, we argue that judgemental ten-
dencies may have been involved in the realization of the multimodal
affective–congruency effect involving audiovisual stimuli in the present
experiment. A side–effect of the instruction to the participants in the
Inanimate–task may have contributed to the reversal of the congruency
effect that we found, namely that participants use the animate category as
reference category because that leads to the simplest response–selection
strategy. For instance, in the Inanimate–task we initially considered the
picture of a boat with a major chord as affectively congruent, because
the instructed response to the question “Is it not an animal?” is positive,
which is congruent with the affective valence of the chord inmajor mode.
However, the instructed way to determine the correct answer to the
question posed is quite complex, so participants may have inserted an
additional step in their response–selection strategy to circumvent the
complex negation. They may have selected the appropriate response fol-
lowing theprocedure “NO, this boat is not an animal, so I have to press the
Yes–button” instead of “YES this boat is not an animal”. The additional
processes to handle the complex logic inherent in the question posed
in the Inanimate–task, however, do not correspond to the affirmative
response–tendency based on the affective relation between the auditory
flanker and the instructed response. Thus longer latencies were observed
for the condition thatwas a priori labeled as congruent (see Fig. 4.2). If the
chord had been in minor mode, the response tendency would have been
to reject the affective relation between auditory flanker and instructed re-
sponse which would have been congruent with the internal comparison
to the reference category (“NO, not an animal”) resulting in shorter la-
tencies for the incongruent condition. Such a response–selection strategy
is not necessary in the Animate–task, however, because its instruction
was much simpler and our original expectations regarding multimodal
affective–congruency effects can therefore be maintained.
So instead of a simple affective–congruency relation that we expected
between auditory flanker and instructed response, we found that themul-
timodal affective–congruency effect actually is the result of a judgemental
tendency that is related to an additional set of mental processes that par-
ticipants probably used to realize a simpler response–selection strategy
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in the Inanimate–task inwhich the instructed process to determine the re-
sponsewas quite complex. The absence of amain effect of Task, reflecting
the between–subjects response–assignments manipulation, corroborates
this conclusion.
Besides the congruency and task effects, we also obtained a consistent
processing advantage for the animals. Such processing advantages have
frequently been found in other studies that employ the animate versus
inanimate distinction (e.g., Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004; de Groot, 1990;
von Studnitz &Green, 2002). Findings in patient studies have shown that
specific brain lesions can differentially affect the capability to discrimi-
nate between animate and inanimate categories. Caramazza and Shelton
(1998) reasoned that this specific cortical development might be related
to the importance of the animate category during the evolution of human
cognition. Another idea is that the animacy effect is inherently closely
related to affective processing (Brousseau & Buchanan, 2004). An alter-
native explanation of the Picture–category effect may be the difference
in class homogeneity of the animate and inanimate pictures, the former
category consisting of a much smaller and more homogeneous set than
the latter category (see Lemmens, de Haan, van Galen, & Meulenbroek,
2004a). However, the presently found evidence for the role of judgemen-
tal tendencies in multimodal affective–congruency does not rely on this
Picture–category effect.
To summarize, our attempt to elicit a multimodal affective–congru-
ency effect using the affective connotation of the major/minor distinction
was successful as indicated by the significant differences between the af-
fectively congruent and incongruent conditions in both tasks. This find-
ing is important because it shows that affective–information processing
does not depend on the visualmodality (which onemight conclude based
on the existing literature) and that affective–compatibility effects can come
about in a cross–modal fashion. The reversal of the effect in the Inanimate
task hints at the involvement of judgemental tendencies in the realization
of the congruency effect. The multimodal affective–congruency effect
also shows that affectively–charged auditory information is processed by
the semantic system. So despite the fact that our auditory flankers were
task–irrelevant and did not have a clear semantic connotation, they were
nevertheless processed by the semantic systemand their affective features
still “meddled” (Wentura, 2000) with the formation of the responses.
Finally, we would like to mention that the present findings are im-
portant for affective computing (Picard, 1997) which is a human–factors
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research initiative to investigate the merits of including aspects of hu-
man emotion to improve the efficiency of human–computer interfaces.
The finding that the affective connotation of the major/minor distinction
can be used to transmit affect using the auditory modality can be readily
used by sound–designers that need to create affectively–charged earcons
(see Blattner et al., 1989). The affective–congruency effects show that it
is important to maintain affective correspondence to ensure that perfor-
mance stays at an optimal level. Moreover, the reversal of themultimodal
affective–congruency effect in the Inanimate–task demonstrates that com-
plex instructions can lead to unexpected choices by participants that can
interfere with the predetermined patterns of congruency.
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4.A A rating study: Affective charge of the
auditory flankers
Although the literature on the perception and appreciation of the major
and minor consistently attributes a positive appreciation (happy) and a
positive affective charge to the major mode and a negative appreciation
(sad or dreamy) and negative affective charge to the minor mode (see
Crowder, 1984, 1985a, 1985b; Gregory et al., 1996; Pittenger, 2003), we
nevertheless carried out a rating study to investigate the affective charge
of the auditory flankers that we employed in the present study.
A group of naive participants was instructed tomark each sound they
heard as negatively or positively charged on a 5–point scale on which
position 3 was explicitly labeled as representing a neutral position (a
sound with no affective charge present) and a score of 5 represented a
positive affective charge. In addition to the auditory flankers that we
used in the present study, we also presented flankers that we employed
in other studies and each sound was presented a number of times to
obtain repeated measures of the affective rating.
We expected a significant difference in rating between flankers in
major mode and flankers in minor mode with the major mode receiving
a higher score on the scale than the flankers in minor mode (Crowder,
1985a, 1985b). We also expected (overall) higher ratings for chords from
a higher pitch class than for chords from a lower pitch class (see Collier
& Hubbard, 2001, 2004).
4.A.1 Method
Participants
Forty–four participants took part in the experiment for partial fulfillment
of course requirements. Theirmeanagewas 21.5 years and14participants
were male.
Materials
Ten different sounds that were different on three aspects: Mode (major or
minor mode), Duration (300ms, 1250ms, or 2500ms), and Height (high,
C5 octave, or low, C4 octave). Four out of the ten sounds were the
sounds that we used in the main study of the present chapter: the major
or minor chords of 2500ms in a high or low variation. A similar set of
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four sounds was used that had a duration of 300ms. The sounds with
a duration of 1250ms were only available in the high variation. Each
sound was presented four times and the presentation order was pseudo
randomized.
Procedure
The participants were seated in similar rooms compared to the partici-
pants in the experiment on the multimodal affective–congruency effect.
Theywere instructed to determine, by their personal preference, whether
the sound(s) that they would hear carried a positive or negative affective
charge. The instruction explicitly stated that participants should use the
third point of the 5–point scale for sounds that they felt were neither
positively charged nor negatively charged.
There were no practice trials and participants had around 10 seconds
to determine the rating before a fixation cross and alert beep indicated the
imminent presentation of the next sound (that would start 1 second after
the alert beep). The participants wrote down the ratings on unmarked
sheets of paper with 40 lines numbered lines, one for each sound, with
the numbers 1–5 preprinted equally spaced over the line.
4.A.2 Results & Conclusions
Visual inspection of the raw data did not highlight clear deviations from
the normality assumption for anANOVA.We therefore computed amean
affective rating for each flanker for each participant and carried out a
repeated–measures ANOVA on Mode × Height × Duration. Note that
we did not include the flankers with a duration of 1250ms in the analysis
because doing so would have resulted in an incomplete design as these
flankers were only available in the high (C5) variation. The mean ratings
are presented in Table 4.2.
A repeated–measures ANOVA confirmed that the rating of the flank-
ers inmajormodewas significantly higher (F(1, 43) = 38.776,MSE = .429,
p = .000) than the rating of the flankers in minor mode (3.21 vs. 2.77). As
expected, we found that higher flankers were, in general, rated more
positive (3.60) than flankers that were an octave lower in pitch (2.43;
F(1, 43) = 36.992,MSE = 2.99, p = .000).
The main effect of Duration was not significant (F < 1) but Duration
did modulate Mode (Mode × Duration: F(1, 43) = 5.262, MSE = .147,
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Table 4.2: Mean affective rating (on a 5–point scale with a score of 5 representing a
positive affective charge) for the major and minor chords that were employed in the




300ms 3.2 (0.08) 3.7 (0.09)
2500ms 3.4 (0.17) 3.9 (0.17)
Low (C4)
300ms 2.4 (0.09) 2.7 (0.10)
2500ms 2.0 (0.17) 2.6 (0.17)
p = .027): the difference in affective rating is larger for the 2500ms
flankers (0.53; F(1, 43) = 39.230, MSE = .521, p = .000) than for the
shorter 300ms flankers (difference, 0.34; F(1, 43) = 27.583, MSE = 1.782,
p = .000). So, although the difference in rating of the 300ms flankers is
significant (a result previously obtained by Crowder, 1985a, 1985b), the
increased duration of the 2500ms flankers results in a clearer perception
as positively or negatively charged for the flankers in major and minor
mode, respectively.
The interaction of Duration andHeight just reached the level of signif-
icance: F(1, 43) = 4.319, MSE = .806, p = .044. The 2500ms sounds were
ratedmore positive in the C5/high variation than the 300ms flankers (3.65
vs. 3.45, respectively) whereas the situation was reversed for the lower
C4 flankers (2500ms, 2.33; 300ms, 2.53). The 3–way interaction as well
as the interaction between Mode and Height were not significant (F < 1
or p > .1).
Posthoc comparisons of the ratings for each pair of flankers in major
and minor mode (e.g., the 300ms C4 flankers) showed that all flankers in
major mode were consistently rated higher on the 5–point scale than the
accompanying flanker in minor mode and that all differences between
these scores were significant (all p’s < .001, Bonferroni corrected).
From these results we conclude that our assumption, that the sounds
that we employed were affectively charged and, more specifically, that
the flankers in major mode were rated more positive than the flankers
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in minor mode, was not unwarranted. Therefore, we conclude that the
presumed and confirmed affective charge of the auditory flankers can be
used to, a priori, determine the affective compatibility of the relationship
between the flankers and other affectively–charged task–features. From
this line of reasoning we gather that the affective charge of the flankers
was not involved in the reversal of the affective–congruency effect that
we observed for the group of participants that carried out the Inanimate–
task in the present study. That is, it is unlikely that the different task–
requirements for the Inanimate–task resulted in a different (affective)
appreciation of the auditory flankers.
4.B. A rating study: Affective charge of the visual targets 67
4.B A rating study: Affective charge of the
visual targets
The multimodal affective–congruency effect that we report in the present
study builds on the dimensional overlap (Kornblum et al., 1990) of the
affective charge of the auditory flankers and the affective charge of the
responses with the added assumption that the visual targets should be af-
fectively neutral because otherwise an overlap between the task–relevant
stimulus and the response or between the task–relevant (S r) and task–
irrelevant stimulus (S i) features can potentially confound with the affec-
tive–congruency effect that is under investigation. It is, however, nearly
impossible to find such a set of visual targets for our participant popula-
tion as nearly every picture (i.e., nearly every object or concept) has the
potential to evoke some kind of affective response and this response can
vary strongly between participants.
We therefore investigated whether the mean affective charge of the
category of animals and inanimate objects was significantly different.
To do so we created a rating questionnaire in which all available visual
targets were presented and we requested the participants to rate each
picture on a 7–point scale by its perceived affective charge. We expected
that the mean affective rating of these categories would not be different,
although both categories could be rated as either positive or negative (as
compared to the affectively neutral midpoint of 4).
4.B.1 Method
Participants
On a voluntary basis, we selected 25 participants (8 males) that had not
recently taken part in any of our studies. With the exception of their
gender, the participants could fill in the questionnaire anonymously.
Materials
The questionnaire consisted of handout in which 30 pictures were pre-
sented (6 on each page). The pictures comprised 12 pictures of animals
(including the 8 pictures that we used in the present study), 8 pictures
of musical instruments and 10 pictures of inanimate objects (again in-
cluding the 8 pictures employed in the present study). Space for writing
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Table 4.3: Mean affective rating (and SD’s in parentheses) on a 7–point scale (with
7 representing a positive valence) for the picture categories employed in the present
study as well as the other studies reported in this dissertation.
Picture category
Animals Inanimate objects Musical instruments
Rating 4.67 (0.44) 4.56 (0.36) 4.44 (0.50)
down the names as well as a 7–point scale for each individual picture was
provided.
Procedure
Participants were handed the questionnaires and were requested to fill
the requested data at a leisurely moment at which they could not be
disturbed. For each picture the participants had to fill in the name of
the picture and their personal affective rating on a 7–point scale of which
position 4 was implicitly labeled as affectively neutral.
4.B.2 Results & Conclusions
Before statistical analysis, the data from one participant were removed
because of procedural inconsistencies. We verified visually whether we
could see clear deviations from the normal distribution. Because this was
not the case, we computed mean affective ratings for each category of
pictures for all participants and subjected these scores to paired t–tests
to investigate whether the mean ratings were statistically different. We
limit the discussion to the pair of categories of most interest: animals
vs. inanimate objects. The mean affective ratings for all categories are
presented in Table 4.3.
The paired t–tests showed that the 0.11 difference between the cate-
gory of animals and inanimate objects was not significant (t(23) = 1.284,
ns). However, closer inspection showed that the subset of pictures thatwe
employed in the present study contained a number of pictures of animals
that were rated relatively high whereas the inanimate objects contained
pictures that were rated relatively low. Comparing the mean affective
rating for these 8 pictures of animals (4.86) and the 8 pictures of inani-
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mate objects (4.47) showed that these ratingswere different: t(23) = 3.899,
p = .001.
Therefore, we removed the highest rated pictures from the set of ani-
mals (i.e., the squirrel and the butterfly; see Figure 4.3) and the pictures
rated lowest from the set of inanimate objects (i.e., the loaf of bread and
the shoe) and again tested the difference between the (new) mean rating
for animals (4.63) and the rating for the inanimate objects (4.60). This 0.03
difference proved non–significant (t(23) = 0.300, ns).
We then carried out the same repeated–measures ANOVA on Task ×
Picture category × Congruency, that we used in the main analysis, on
a subset of data from which the pictures of the squirrel, butterfly, the
shoe, and the loaf of bread were removed. The effects of interest are
the (absence of a) main effect for Congruency (Affectively congruent,
427ms; Affectively incongruent 427ms; F < 1) and the interaction with
Task (F(1, 36) = 11.608, MSE = 714.6, p = .002). In the Animal–task
we again observed the predicted congruency effect (congruent, 428ms;
incongruent, 443ms; F(1, 36) = 6.565, MSE = 2858.4, p = .015) whereas
the effect reversed in the Inanimate–task (congruent, 425ms; incongruent,
411ms; F(1, 36) = 5.188, MSE = 2858.4, p = .029). These results are
equivalent to the findings in the present study in which the data from all
visual targets were used.
If one assumes that a score of around 5.5 for the picture of the squir-
rel and the butterfly represents a genuine positive valence and one also
assumes that participants completely ignore the auditory flanker, then
alternative compatibility relations between the affective charge of these
specific pictures and the affective property of the responses can be de-
termined. For instance, for the picture of the squirrel (with a positive
affective valence) this would imply that all trials acquired from the par-
ticipants carrying out the Animal–task can be considered to be affectively
congruent, because throughout that task a Yes–response (also with a
positive affective charge) was associated to pictures of animals. On the
other hand, in the Inanimate–task No–responses (with a negative affec-
tive charge) were associated to pictures of animals. Thus, in the data
from this task, trials involving the picture of the squirrel can be consid-
ered affectively incongruent because the (momentarily assumed) positive
affective charge of the squirrel is incongruent with the affective valence
of the instructed response. We therefore computed mean RT’s for the
Animate–task (congruent condition) as well as Inanimate–task (the in-
congruent condition) on all data points without sound from all blocks,
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Figure 4.3: Mean affective rating for each picture employed in the present study, per
category in an increasing order of rating. Thewhiskers represent the standard deviation.
On the abscissa is the rating scale with ratings above 4 indicating a positive valences and
ratings below 4 representing negative valences. Mean rating for the pictures of animals
was 4.67 and the mean rating for the inanimate objects was 4.56. Note that some of the
pictures are slightly deformed due to rescaling for this figure.
for each subject, for the pictures of the squirrel and the butterfly. We
then assessed whether the difference between these sets of data was sig-
nificant using an independent–samples t–test. This test showed that the
difference was not significant (t(36) = 1.400, p > .17). We conclude that, if
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present, the affective charge of the pictures of the squirrel and the butter-
fly did not result in compatibility relations with the affective charge of the
responses. Note, however, that side–effects of the blocked design may
invalidate these conclusions and that removing the assumption of the
ignored flankers would complicate this line of reasoning considerably.
We conclude, tentatively, that the affective charge of the pictures that
were rated relatively high (low) compared to the other pictures of animals
(inanimate objects) did not influence the realization of the multimodal
affective congruency effect. In general, this applies to the entire set of
pictures that we employed in the present study.

C 5
Effects of Animacy and Categorical
Homogeneity in Multimodal Affective
Categorization†
Dealing with failure is easy: Work hard
to improve. Success is also easy to
handle: You’ve solved the wrong
problem. Work hard to improve.
Alan Perlis’ Epigrams
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Abstract
In the present study we evaluate the extent to which the relative ho-
mogeneity of picture categories elicits dedicated information–processing
strategies that facilitate reaction speedwhen people perceive and identify
stimuli that belong to a specific category. In a study of the multimodal
affective–congruency effect Lemmens, deHaan andVanGalen (2004) con-
cluded that the observed response–time advantage for one of the picture
categories that they used could be attributed to a specific processing ad-
vantage favoring animates over inanimates. The results from the present
study, however, show that categorical homogeneity plays a more impor-
tant role in the picture–category effect, as well as in demonstrating the
multimodal affective–congruency effect itself, than an effect of animate-
ness. These findings prompt for a re–interpretation of the results reported
by Lemmens et al. (2004).
†This chapter is submitted as Lemmens, P. M. C., de Haan, A., van Galen, G. P., &
Meulenbroek, R. G. J. (2004). Effects of Animacy and Categorical Homogeneity inMultimodal
Affective Categorization. Manuscript submitted for publication to Psychological Research.
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5.1 Introduction
The animacy effect refers to a processing advantage for animals com-
pared to inanimate objects. For instance, Lawrence (1971, cited in Pash-
ler, 1998a) found that people more readily detected an animal name in
a list of non–animal names than a non–animal name in a list of animal
names. With lexical decision and animateness–categorization tasks, de
Groot (1990) observed that associative–priming effects were larger for an-
imateness categorization than for lexical decision, but only when the tar-
getswere animate (Exp. 1–2). BrousseauandBuchanan (2004) obtainedan
animate advantage that they attributed to a possible association between
those animate items and subjective valence. In an animate/inanimate cat-
egorization within a language–switching task, von Studnitz and Green
(2002) observed faster animate decisions than inanimate decisions. Such
overall processing advantages were also observed by de Groot (1990).
It is known that the animate/inanimate distinction serves a special role
in category development in children (e.g. see, Mandler, 1997; Rakison &
Poulin–Dubois, 2004). Patient studies have shown that lesions can differ-
entially affect animate and inanimate categories (Caramazza & Shelton,
1998). These findings all highlight a special role for animate objects in the
formation and recognition of categories of objects.
Recently, Lemmens et al. (2004) reported a multimodal affective–con-
gruency effect in an animate/inanimate picture–categorization task. In
that task, we presented major and minor chords simultaneously, as au-
ditory flankers, with the visual targets. Crowder (1985a) had shown that
a stable connotation existed for major chords related to positive valence
and minor chords to negative valence and we exploited this connotation
to create a dimensional overlap between the affective feature of the re-
sponses (Yes– orNo–buttonpresses) and the auditory flankers. We found,
however, that the overlap did not exist between the auditory flankers and
the overtly executedYes– andNo–responses but between the flankers and
an internal covert response (e.g., “YES, this is an animal picture, so, by
instruction, I now have to press the No–button”) that was realized by
emphasizing the importance of the animate category in the instruction.
The dimensional overlap between the covert responses and the auditory
flankers resulted in a set of congruent flanker–response pairings (e.g.,
YES and major chord or NO and minor chord) and pairings that were
incongruent (e.g., YES and minor chord or NO and major chord). The
response–time differences between the congruent and incongruent con-
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ditions were found to be significant, indicating a multimodal affective–
congruency effect. Besides this effect, we also found a significant effect
of picture category showing a processing advantage for the pictures of
animals. Because we obtained this advantage when participants had to
respond with Yes to the animates as well as when the animates were as-
signed a No–response, we concluded that an animacy effect was the most
likely cause since a speed advantage for Yes–responses alone could not
account for the findings.
However, the emphasis that was put on the animals may in itself
have prompted strategic use of that emphasis, possibly also resulting in
processing advantages for animals, because participants may have (sub-
consciously) allocatedmore resources to theprocessingof the emphasized
category. Processing advantages due to the increased resource allocation
could thus have been confoundedwith a processing advantage due to the
animacy effect. Moreover, the set of animate objects was a homogeneous
well–defined set almost exclusively consisting of mammals. Literature
on categorization (e.g. see Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) has shown that items
in such sets are often categorized by exemplar or prototype similarity
which is a fast and efficient process. Categorization by exemplar similar-
ity, however, was impossible for the set of inanimate objects because this
set was rather heterogeneous including pictures of means of transporta-
tion, footwear, and a toy. The inanimate objects could, therefore, not be
tagged with a unique simple tag like “toy” or “tool”. We propose that
a more laborious and slower hypothesis–testing approach to categoriza-
tion was required to verify each item against a relatively large superset
of inanimate objects. As the choice of categorization type is the result of
the differences in degree of homogeneity, the difference may have caused
a processing advantage for the animate objects because of their increased
homogeneity. This processing advantage is again confounded with the
animacy effect.
Therefore, in our view three accounts exist that can all explain the
effect of picture category that Lemmens et al. found: (a) an effect of
animacy, (b) processing differences due to the differences in homogeneity
of the categories of animate and inanimate objects, and (c) strategic use
of the accentuation of the animate objects. The present study was set
up to disentangle these different accounts. The implicit encouragement
of strategically using the emphasis on the animate objects to realize the
internal covert response stage was part of the experimental design of
our previous experiments that we did not want to change to maintain a
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degree of comparability between the results. We thereby attempted to
extricate the animacy effect and potential processing differences due to
differences in categorical homogeneity.
Hence, we sought to decrease the heterogeneity of the category of
inanimate objects. In contrast to the earlier experiments we exploited the
two homogeneous categories of animals and musical instruments as ani-
mate/inanimate categories, rather than a homogeneous set of animals in
combinationwith a heterogeneous set ofmiscellaneous inanimate objects.
This setup enabled us to test the contrast between a potential processing
advantage for the pictures of animals that was entirely due to their ani-
mate nature versus aprocessing advantage thatwas inadvertently created
as result of the different degrees of homogeneity. If we were correct in
surmising the involvement of the animacy effect, changing the inanimate
objects to a homogeneous set of musical instruments should not matter
for the effect of picture category. That is, a response–time advantage for
pictures of animals should still be found regardless whether the second
category would be a well defined homogeneous category like musical
instruments (or toys or tools) or an ill–defined heterogeneous category.
If, on the other hand, processing strategies due to differences in homo-
geneity were responsible for the effect of picture category, decreasing the
differences between the degree of homogeneity of each category of ob-
jects should result in similar categorization strategies and thus in similar
response–time latencies for both categories.
Note, however, that wemaintained the same emphasis on one specific
category of objects that Lemmens et al. used. As we explained above,
in itself this accentuation may have had the effect of increased allocation
of resources to the processing of the emphasized category, resulting in
decreased response times. If this would be the case in the present study,
response–time differences should be observed in a group of participants
for which one category is emphasized and the other one is not. For
instance, if one group participants would receive emphasis on the set of
musical instruments, for that group a processing advantage would be
expected for the category of instruments compared to the category of
animals (v.v. for emphasis on animals for another group of participants).
Thus, within a group of participants an effect of picture category would
still be expected, favoring the category of pictures receiving accentuation
in the instruction.
Also observe that if categorical homogeneity indeed proves to be re-
sponsible for the picture–category effect, it may affect the multimodal
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affective–congruency effect itself because earlier results already showed
larger congruency effects for the heterogeneous inanimate objects. The
change in categorical homogeneity of the inanimate objects might there-
fore have an impact on the multimodal affective–congruency effect in the
present study. With two homogeneous categories of objects, the congru-
ency effect was expected to shrink in absolute size.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Forty–nine participants (13 male, mean age 22.1 years) took part in the
experiment for either € 4.50 or partial fulfillment of course requirements.
5.2.2 Materials, Stimuli & Design
Because of the multimodal aspect of the experiments, both auditory and
visual stimuli were employed. The auditory stimuli were C4 and C5 (i.e.,
a lower andhigher variant of)major andminor triads in root positionwith
a duration of 2500ms, that were created by a professional sound designer
using a Roland midi module. The visual stimuli consisted of sixteen
black and white line-drawings of animals and musical instruments (see
Fig. 3.1). The animals depicted were a squirrel, a butterfly, a cat, a dog,
a lion, a bird, a cow, and a frog. The musical instruments comprised a
violin, a trumpet, a drum, a saxophone, a guitar, a flute, an accordion, and
a harp. Care was taken to ensure that all pictures were approximately of
the same size when displayed on the experimental equipment.
The experiment was carried out on a Macintosh PowerMac G3 that
was equipped with a 17 in. screen. A button box attached to the exper-
imental computer was used to accurately synchronize the presentation
of the visual and auditory stimuli, and to register response–time laten-
cies. One button was labeled “Yes” and another button was labeled
“No” (the actual labels were in Dutch); the order of the labeling was
counterbalanced between subjects to prevent effects of preferred hand
and to prevent a confound due to a possible natural tendency to assign
affirmative responses to the right hand (Wentura, 2000). Simple stereo-
phonic headphones were used to present the auditory stimuli (although
no stereophonic effects were used).
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To counterbalance the emphasis on each category of pictures, we em-
ployed a between–subjects factor Task. Participants instructed to respond
with Yes–responses to pictures of animals carried out the Animal task,
whereas participants assigned to the group instructed to respond Yes to
pictures of musical instruments carried out the Instrument task. For both
groups each participantworked through the samewithin–subjects design
(see Table 5.1) containing twelve trial blocks incorporating the factors Pic-
ture category (Animals or Instruments) and Mode (Major or Minor). The
blocks were constructed using the following procedure that created two
different sets of four trial blocks and another two sets of two trial blocks.
The twelve trial blocks were different with regard to the fixed relation
between the Mode of the auditory flanker and the Picture category it
was associated to. For both tasks, in four trial blocks all pictures of
animalswere combinedwith the soundof either theC4 orC5major chord,
and all pictures of musical instruments were combined with the minor
chords. Similarly, in another four trial blocks the pictures of animals
were combined with either the C4 or C5 minor chord and pictures of the
instruments with either the C4 or C5 major chord. The remaining four
trial blocks implemented a condition in which both categories of pictures
were accompanied by the same sound (two trial blocks with only major
chords, C4 or C5, and two with only minor chords).
Individual trial blocks contained 32 stimuli: 8 pictures of animals and
8 of musical instruments in the indicated picture–sound combinations
(see Table 5.1) and the same 16 pictures without sound to create a base-
line condition and to prevent participants exploiting the fixed relation
between picture and sound especially present in blocks 1 and 2. Given a
set of twelve different trial blocks, the total number of trials amounted to
384 trials per experiment. Within a trial block the stimuli were random-
ized differently for each stimulus list. The presentation order of the trial
blocks over participants was according to a latin square.
5.2.3 Procedure
Participants were instructed to press buttons according to a question that
was posed before commencing the experiment. Participants assigned to
the Animal categorization taskwere instructed to answer the question “Is
the picture you see that of an animal?” by pressing a button labeled “Yes”
or “No’. For the group of participants that carried out the Instrument
categorization task, the question was “Is the picture you see that of a
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Table 5.1: Visualization of the design of the experiment. For each group of participants
the various combinations of pictures and types of sound are presented.
Task: Animal −→ Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animal major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Instrument minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Repetitions 4 4 2 2
Task: Instrument −→ Yes
Picture category Sound type
Animal major (8) minor (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Instrument minor (8) major (8) major (8) minor (8)
no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8) no sound (8)
Repetitions 4 4 2 2
Note. Sound type represents the major/minor distinction of the factor Mode, but also
includes the no–sound baseline trials (n = 16) within a trial block (n = 32). Numbers
in parentheses represent the number of trials. The two leftmost trial blocks (in the text
referred to as blocks 1 and 2) were each replicated four times whereas the two rightmost
trial blocks (referred to as blocks 3 and 4) were each replicated twice. The trial blocks
marked in bold can be considered congruent blocks whereas italics indicates trial blocks
that can be considered to be incongruent.
musical instrument?”. Participants were instructed to do this quickly
and accurately; they were not explicitly instructed to ignore the sounds,
but neither were they encouraged to relate the sounds to the pictures
they would see and the responses they would make. Participants could
practice on ten trials randomly drawn from the set of experimental trials.
The presentation of a single trial started with the presentation of a
fixation cross for 500ms (plus an alert beep). After a 1000ms pause, the
visual and auditory stimuli were presented simultaneously. The visual
stimulus was presented for 300ms. The maximal response time was set
at 2500ms. The inter–trial interval was set at 1500ms. The entire session
had a duration of approximately 35 minutes.
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5.2.4 Data analysis
We analyzed the data using the factor Mode to further investigate possi-
ble differences between trials with auditory flankers in major mode and
trials with flankers inminormode. BecauseModewas nestedwithin con-
gruency we were unable to include congruency as a factor in the analysis
design and for each task we therefore assessed the difference between
animal–major and animal–minor pairings (similarly for the instrument
pairs) using paired samples t–tests as an alternative way to evaluate con-
gruency.
In a similar way, the balancing of the assignment of responses to each
picture category that was carried out using the factor Task—participants
carrying out theAnimal task always respondedYes to animal pictures and
No to instruments, whereas this relationwas reversed for the participants
assigned to the Instrument task— created a nested design, preventing the
inclusion of the factor Response (Yes or No) into the ANOVA. Therefore,
provided there was no effect of Task, we used independent–samples t–
tests to assess differences in Yes– and No–responses within a picture
category.
Besides an ANOVA on subjects (computing averages for 49 subjects
over the 16 different pictures), we carried out an item analysis as well
(computing averages for 16 items over 49 subjects). In this analysis,
Picture category was a between–subjects variable. The item analyses are
reported as F2 (or t2), whereas the ANOVA on subjects is reported as F1
(or t1). All statistical tests were carried out against a significance level of
α = .05.
5.3 Results
We earlier only used data from blocks 1 and 2 for statistical analysis
because the congruency effect was of main interest. Here we will also
report on the data from blocks 3 and 4 that can be seen as variants of
blocks 1 and 2 without the fixed relation between picture and sound that
is present in the latter blocks. We decided to incorporate the baseline
trials within each block in the figures that we have drawn but not to take
these data points into the statistical analyses because a comparison of
trials with and without sound seemed inappropriate.
Because we employed two homogeneous categories of pictures, we
did not expect a difference in mean response–time latencies between the
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category of animals and musical instruments. As the present design
enabled us to disentangle the effects of degree of homogeneity versus
processing advantages due to speeded Yes–responses, we expected that
there would be no response–time differences for Yes– and No–responses
to each picture category. On the contrary, we expected an interaction
of Task and Picture category that would speak for strategic use of the
emphasis on one of the categories of objects (animals in the Animal task
and musical instruments in the Instrument task). Finally, the earlier ex-
periments showed the strongest congruency effects in the heterogeneous
category of inanimate objects. Because we changed that category, we
anticipated less pronounced congruency effects in this experiment.
Errors
Before analysis, errors and omissions were removed from the set. These
comprised only 2.1%of the total number of data points andwere therefore
not analyzed further.
Response times
The Task × Picture category × Mode repeated–measures ANOVA (see
Fig. 5.1) on blocks 1 and 2 showed no main effect for Picture category.
Mean response–time latencies for animals were 439ms and 442ms for
the musical instruments (F1 < 1; F2(1, 28) = 2.043, MSE = 92.1, ns). The
between–subjects factor Task did not show a main effect as well (Animal
task, 438ms; Instrument task, 443ms; F1 < 1).
The interaction of Task and Picture category, that we anticipated, was
significant (see Fig. 5.1, F1(1, 47) = 28.605, MSE = 1377.1; F2(1, 28) =
141.658, MSE = 92.1). The interaction revealed that for the Animal task
mean RT’s for pictures of animals were faster (422ms) than those for
pictures of instruments (454ms, F1(1, 47) = 18.562,MSE = 5508.3; t2(14) =
−10.542) whereas this was reversed for the Instrument task (Animals,
456ms; Instruments, 431ms; F1(1, 47) = 10.670, MSE = 5508.3; t2(14) =
6.759).
However, this result was not due to the assignments of Yes–responses
to the emphasized category. Comparisons of the mean RT’s for Yes–
responses and No–responses for each category of objects across par-
ticipant groups showed that although participants in the Animal task
(animal pictures with Yes–responses) were 34ms quicker compared to






















































































































































Figure 5.1: Mean response–time latencies (ms) from blocks 1 and 2 for each task for both
picture categories and major and minor mode, including baseline trials from the same
block. RT’s and SE’s (in parentheses) at the bottom of each bar. The pairs of black or gray
and white bars reflect means of data points from the same block for each category of
pictures. For instance, the black and white bars in the left panel for the animal pictures
reflect the means for the animal–major combinations from blocks 1 and the associated
baseline trials from the same block (see Table 5.1). The directly neighboring gray and
white pair reflects the data points from blocks 2. The picture categories are ordered
according to the Yes– and No–response assignments: In each panel the picture category
on the left was assigned the Yes–response.
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the Instrument task), this difference was not significant (F1(1, 47) = 2.142,
MSE = 6481.8, ns). Similarly, for Yes– and No–responses to pictures of
instruments, the 23ms advantage for Yes–responses was not significant
(F1(1, 47) = 1.052,MSE = 6185.5, ns).
The data from blocks 3 and 4 showed a similar pattern of results (see
Fig. 5.2) with non–significant main effects for Picture category (Animal
pictures as well as Instruments, overall, 444ms; F1 < 1) and Task (F1 < 1;
Animal task, 442ms; Instrument task, 445ms).
For the blocks 3 and 4, the interaction Task × Picture category was sig-
nificant (F1(1, 47) = 49.890,MSE = 929.8). In theAnimal task, participants
were quicker to respond to pictures of animals (427ms) than to pictures
of instruments (458ms; F1(1, 47) = 25.860, MSE = 3719.2) whereas par-
ticipants were quicker responding to pictures of instruments (430ms v.s.
461ms; F1(1, 47) = 24.069, MSE = 3719.2) in the Instrument task. Again
these response–time advantages were not due to the response assign-
ments. Yes–responses to pictures of animals (427ms)were not statistically
different fromNo–responses (461ms; F1(1, 47) = 1.825,MSE = 7761.0, ns).
Similarly, Yes–responses to Instrument pictures (430ms) did not deviate
from the No–responses (458ms; F1(1, 47) = 1.294,MSE = 7174.9, ns).
In the data from blocks 1 & 2, the main effect of Mode was significant
(F1(1, 47) = 5.693,MSE = 61.6, F2(1, 28) = 5.571,MSE = 103.2) indicating
that participants were quicker in responding to minor chords (438ms)
than to major chords (443ms). Mode did not interact with Task (F1 < 1,
F2 < 1) nor with Picture category (F1 < 1, F2 < 1). The three–way
interactionTask×Picture category×Modewas not significant in themain
analysis (F1 < 1) nor in the item analysis (F2(1, 28) = 2.134,MSE = 103.2,
ns).
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the effect of Mode, favoring minor chords,
in all combinations of picture category and sound in both tasks. Note
that only for the picture category that received emphasis in the instruc-
tion (associated with Yes–responses), the difference between major and
minor (reflecting an effect of congruency) approaches levels similar to
those obtained in the earlier study. However, in that study the largest
congruency effectswere actually observed for the category thatwasnot ac-
centuated. Analyses on the data from blocks 1 & 2 showed that although
in the Animal task mean response times to animal pictures with major
(427ms) were slower than the same pictures with aminor chord (417ms),
this difference was not significant (t1(24) = 1.639, SEM = 6.20, ns); the






















































































































































Figure 5.2: Mean response–time latencies (ms) for each task, for both picture categories
and major and minor mode using the data from blocks 3 and 4. RT’s and SE’s (in
parentheses) at the bottom of each bar. The pairs of silent trials and trials with sound
refer to data points from one block. For instance, for the animal pictures in the left
panel, the mean for major sounds and baseline trials are from blocks 3 and the directly
neighboring gray and white pair of means is from blocks 4 (see Table 5.1). The picture
categories are ordered according to the Yes– and No–response assignments: In each
panel the picture category on the left was assigned the Yes–response.
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SEM = 2.22). The difference, in the Instrument task, between major
(435ms) and minor pairings (426ms) with the instruments was almost
the same as the 10ms difference observed between animal–major and
animal–minor pairings in the Animal task, but as before, this difference
was not significant (t1(23) = 1.548, t2(7) = 1.783, both ns).
5.4 Discussion
The present study revealed interesting findings, particularly regarding
the picture–category effect that was obtained in our earlier study. There
we found consistent response–time advantages for the category of ani-
mals and we reasoned that this advantage for the animals was mostly
likely due to an animacy effect, specifically, because we still found the
advantage for the animate objects when participants had to execute No–
responses to these objects which excluded the possibility that the effect
of picture category was due to response–time differences between Yes–
and No–responses. Post hoc analyses of our earlier study showed that
the picture–category effect was significant for the congruent condition
(F(1, 48) = 38.004,MSE = 858.5, p = .000) as well as the incongruent con-
dition (F(1, 48) = 29.019,MSE = 1030.4, p = .000). We therefore had clear
indications that an animacy effect, also observed in several other lines of
research employing the animate/inanimate distinction (e.g., Brousseau &
Buchanan, 2004; de Groot, 1990; von Studnitz &Green, 2002), was a likely
cause of the picture category effect.
However, this explanation referring to an effect of animacy was con-
founded with two other possible explanations. First, it may have been
that participants strategically employed the emphasis that was put on the
category of animate objects. Although the emphasis was an explicit ex-
perimental manipulation, it may have caused the processing advantage
for the animates nonetheless because it might have triggered allocating
additional resources to processing that category. Secondly, a difference
in degree of homogeneity existed between the set of animate and inani-
mate objects that were employed in our earlier study. Nearly all animate
objects that we used were mammals whereas the inanimate objects were
much more diverse, consisting of means of transportation, footwear and
other objects. Participants may have used fast and efficient exemplar or
prototype categorization to classify the animate objects and may have
required the slower hypothesis–based testing (Rosch & Lloyd, 1978) to
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categorize the inanimate objects. The differences between these cate-
gorization processes may also have caused a processing advantage for
animate objects. Both explanations are confounded with the explanation
using the animacy effect and cannot be teased apart using the data of
Lemmens et al. (2004).
Because the encouragement to focus on one specific category was an
essential experimental manipulation, in the present study we alleviated
the differences in degree of homogeneity by using a well–defined set of
inanimate objects, namely musical instruments, instead of the heteroge-
neous set employed in the earlier study. We predicted that this change
would result in the removal of the effect of picture category because both
sets of pictures could now be categorized using exemplar or prototype
based classification. The results of the present study clearly show no ef-
fect of picture category, thus confirming our prediction. This conclusion
was corroborated by a similar finding for the blocks of trials in which
the fixed relation between picture and sound was removed (blocks 3 and
4). We also predicted that the picture category effect was not due to a
difference in processing speeds for Yes– and No–responses. The data,
from blocks 1 and 2 as well as 3 and 4, again confirm this prediction.
Finally, we predicted that processing advantages due to the emphasis
on one specific category of objects would result in an interaction of Task
and picture category, reflecting processing advantages for animals in
the Animal task and for instruments in the Instrument task. The data
clearly confirm thisprediction. Thus, thepresent study falsifies our earlier
conclusion that the picture category effect was due to an effect of animacy.
Instead, the data suggest that the emphasis on a specific category of
objects resulted in the response–timeadvantage. Moreover, in the original
data the processing advantage for the animals was confounded with a
response–time advantage due to different categorization processes for
animate and inanimate objects.
Thus, the data gathered in the present study propose that degree of
homogeneity of two categories employed in an experiment can create
processing advantages reflected in response–time differences for one cat-
egory that are indeed due to the distance in homogeneity and not due to a
specific characteristic of one of the categories. This conclusion may have
consequences for other studies employing the animate/inanimate distinc-
tion in which processing advantages for animate objects frequently have
been found.
For instance, in a naming study Brousseau and Buchanan (2004) used
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pictures of animals, fruits and vegetables, weapons and instruments, and
tools and clothes. They found that “animals were associated with the
fastest mean vocal RT” (p. 245), and that, in general, naming times for
the biological category (animals, fruits, and vegetables) were faster than
those for the non–biological category. They proposed a category dis-
tinction with a biological advantage (although only in young, healthy
females). However, inspection of their stimulus material, in our view,
shows that the non–biological category is less homogeneous than the
biological category. Although a naming task involves different mental
processes than the choice response–time tasks employed in the present
and earlier studies, that difference in degree of homogeneity may never-
theless cause similar processing strategies in the naming task employed
by Brousseau and Buchanan (2004) as those found in the present study.
Such detailed information of the stimuli that were used is not avail-
able for the studies by deGroot (1990) and von Studnitz andGreen (2002).
However, inspection of example material that de Groot (1990) presents in
Table 5.1 (p. 108) seems to show rather heterogeneous categories for both
the animate aswell as the inanimate objects. The comparable heterogene-
ity will most likely not have caused differential processing strategies for
animate and inanimate objects. In a similar, although opposite way, von
Studnitz and Green (2002) seem to have prevented strategies by using
relatively well–defined homogeneous categories like fruits and toys (see
Table 2, p. 245).
Regarding the multimodal affective–congruency effect that was the
focus of our original investigation, the present data suggest that also for
this effect the degree of homogeneity plays an important role. We al-
ready observed larger differences between the congruent and incongru-
ent condition for the inanimate objects. For instance, the regular affective
categorization task in our original study showed a difference of around
10ms between the congruent and incongruent condition for the animate
objects (quite similar although in opposite direction to the 10ms differ-
ence between major and minor chords for animal pictures in the present
Animal task), whereas this difference doubled to approximately 20ms for
the inanimate objects (which is clearly not the case in the present Animal
task). Their reversed task showed a similar pattern although smaller in
number. In the present study, with two homogeneous sets of objects, no
congruency effects (expressed as the difference betweenmajor andminor
chords for each level of Task × Picture category) were found however.
The only relevant difference between the present and earlier study is
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the degree of homogeneity of the inanimate objects and, therefore, the
processes used to categorize the different sets of objects (i.e., exemplar–
based vs. hypothesis–based categorization). We speculate that the hypo-
thesis–testing approach to categorization takes more information into
account (to improve the quality of a decision) than the exemplar–based
categorization used for the animate objects. The fixed relation between
picture and sound within blocks 1 & 2 could well have been that ad-
ditional information. Because this fixed relation reflects the effect of
congruency, we observed larger congruency effects for the set of objects
categorized by hypothesis–based testing (i.e., the inanimate objects). The
relatively low number of errors that the participants committed corrob-
orates the claim of high quality responses. We tentatively conclude that
the multimodal affective–congruency effect observed in earlier studies
(e.g. Lemmens et al., 2004, a study that was based on research reported
in Van Esch–Bussemakers, 2001) may have been overestimated. The in-
creased response–time differences between major and minor chords in
the hypothesis–based categorization of the inanimate objects were pos-
sibly caused by the strategic use of the fixed relation (within one block)
between picture and sound. Awaiting further evidence, the present find-
ings lead us to, at least, question the explanation of Lemmens et al. (2004)
that was purely in terms of an affective overlap between the covert re-
sponses (realized by emphasizing a particular category) and the valence
of the major and minor chords.
An additional difference with the earlier study is that in the present
study we observed an effect of Mode: participants responded faster to
minor chords than they did to major chords. Although we then could
not explicitly report on response time differences between major and
minor chords (resp., 437ms and 435ms) because of the nesting in con-
gruency, a post hoc analysis with Mode instead of Congruency showed
that this difference was not significant (Exp. 2, Task × Picture category
× Mode. Main effect of Mode, F(1, 48) < 1). This difference in the pres-
ence and absence of an effect of Mode can be explained referring to the
nesting of Picture category and Mode in the factor Congruency. Com-
pare, for instance, the Animal task from the present study and the regular
affective–categorization task from our earlier study. In the latter study
the congruency effect for the animals essentially reflects response–time
advantages for major chords, because animals required Yes–responses
that were affectively congruent with the major chord and the congruent
condition was faster than the incongruent condition. For the inanimate
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objects, however, the situation was reversed. Inanimate objects requiring
a No–response were affectively congruent with a minor chord, therefore
associating minor chords with faster responses and major chords with
slower responses. Collapsed over picture category, response–time differ-
ences between major and minor chords therefore cancelled out. As can
be seen in Figure 5.1, in the present study however, the advantage for
the minor chords in the Animal pictures (in the Animal task) was not
counteracted by an opposing force inhibiting response times to theminor
chord in the category of musical instruments.
One peculiarity in the present set of data remains. Observe that in
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 only in the Instrument task, only for the pictures of
Instruments, trials with sound are (at least numerically) faster than trials
without sound (this numerical trend is marginally significant in blocks
3 & 4, t(23) = 1.996, SEM = 8.48, p = .058). We hesitate to attribute a
role to this phenomenon that is relevant for the present study, although
we would like to argue that the inhibition of sound that we observe in
all other (sub)sets of data is contrary to the idea common in human–
factors research that, in general, the addition of sound is beneficial for
performance.
In sum, the present study shows that homogeneity of a category can be
a confounding factor in studies using or investigating the animate versus
inanimate distinction. The confound should be carefully controlled as
it may require different interpretations of experimental results like, for
instance, in the study by Brousseau and Buchanan (2004). At least, the
attribution of the picture category to the animacy effect by Lemmens et al.
(2004) has been shown to be incorrect. The degree of homogeneity also
has an impact on the multimodal affective–congruency effect although a
conclusion on the precise effects requires further experimentation. More
research is of course required to define the notion of homogeneity.
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Abstract
This thesis presented research and a review of literature on the domains
of stimulus–response compatibility (SRC), affective–compatibility effects
and affective computing, and how the affective connotation of the major
and minor modes in Western tonal music can be used to create audi-
tory feedback–signals that can communicate affect to a perceiver. The
work started with an emphasis on human–factors research based on rel-
atively simple assumptions, but the focus gradually shifted to answering
research questions of a more basic nature because we encountered the
limitations of our assumptions and method. Nevertheless, the general
theme always was the multimodal affective–congruency effect that was
initially observed by Van Esch–Bussemakers (2001, although she did not
yet label the effect as such). We used her paradigm to investigate the
potential impact of affective–compatibility effects in affective–computing
research (Picard, 1997), and exploited that paradigm to explore the cogni-
tivemechanisms involved indetermining the affective–congruency effect.
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In this chapter we summarize the review that we presented in Chap-
ter 2 and reiterate the results from the studies reported in Chapters 3, 4,
and 5, focusing on the reversed congruency effects that we obtained. We
also address some of the implications of our findings for human–factors
research. In addition, we discuss the experimental method that we used
and describe the contours of a tentative model of hot and cold cogni-
tion that encapsulates our findings and our reasoning on the multimodal
affective–congruency effect.
6.1 Summary of the chapters
Following the introductory chapter (Ch. 1), this thesis continued with a
review of literature on SRC phenomena (Ch. 2) that we considered to
be relevant topics for research into affective computing. Affective com-
puting is a relatively recent addition to human–factors research that tries
to improve human–computer interaction by incorporating aspects of the
well–developed human–human interaction, in this case by embedding
capabilities in interfaces to recognize and communicate emotion (see Pi-
card, 1997). Three studies followed, reported in Chapters 3, 4, and 5,
that all focused on the multimodal affective–congruency effect. Most of
this work was carried out in the later stages of the project; some of it in
parallel. We chose this particular order of presentation because it follows
the chronology of our work and reflects the evolution of the paradigm
and method that we used.
Chapter 2
After the brief introduction in Chapter 1 of the main themes (stimulus–
response compatibility, multimodal information–processing, and affec-
tive computing), Chapter 2 further elaborated them. The main goal
of the chapter was to argue that research in affective computing could
benefit from the findings from typical stimulus–response compatibility
(SRC) literature by showing that the existence of affective–compatibility
effects is indicative of an interaction between hot and cold cognition.
Furthermore, the affective Simon task was presented as a special case of
SRC paradigms to investigate affective–compatibility effects in line with
the taxonomy of SRC paradigms that was proposed by Kornblum et al.
(1990). The major/minor distinction in Western tonal music, referring
to a positive interpretation of music played in major mode compared
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to a more negative interpretation of music written in minor mode, was
introduced as one way to attach affective valence to affectively–neutral
stimuli that is specifically suitable for affective (human–factors) research
employing multimodal stimuli. We concluded that SRC paradigms, in
the affective domain, are a viable alternative to the cumbersome although
direct measurements of the autonomous nervous system’s responses. We
proposed that the major/minor distinction can be used as an additional
transformation of affectively–neutral (families of) earcons (short musical
sounds to aid in, for instance, navigation; see Blattner et al., 1989) to gen-
erate variations that are capable of communicating affectively–charged
information.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 presented a study in which the transformation to major or
minor mode was used to show that it can indeed generate earcons that
are capable of communicating affect. In an animate/inanimate picture–
categorization task, earcons in major and minor mode were simultane-
ously presented with visual targets. Because participants had to execute
positive or negative responses, a dimensional overlap between the irrel-
evant stimulus (the earcons) and the response was created. We observed
that participants were indeed slower to respond to specific combinations
of affective valence of stimulus and response. Surprisingly, however,
longer response–time latencies were observed for the more natural con-
gruent condition (i.e., positive responses to trials with major chords and
negative responses to trials with minor chords) whereas the RT’s from
the incongruent condition were short.
Assuming that major and minor chords do have the affective con-
notation of positive valence and negative valence, respectively, and that
the more natural compatible conditions should normally show improved
performance compared to less natural incompatible conditions in SRC
tasks, we proposed that participants changed their information–process-
ing strategy in a way that may have influenced how they determined the
instructed responses. This change must have incorporated an evaluation
with an affective charge opposite to that of the instructed response. For
instance, if the supposed natural (and thus faster) combination of positive
valence (of the instructed response) and major chord actually is slower
than the supposed less natural (and thus slower) combination of positive
valence and minor chord, the former combination must have been an
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incompatible one for the participants’ cognitive system.
Tentatively we suggested that our assumption that Yes–responses are
associated with positive affective–valence (and v.v. for No–responses)
was violated in the Instrument−→Yes part of the experiment. In the latter
part of the experiments participants were (still) instructed to determine
their responses by answering the question “Is the picture you see that of
an animal?”, but by verbal and written examples they were, essentially,
requested to give the wrong answer (i.e., to press the No–button for ani-
mals and the Yes–button for the instruments). This may have resulted in
Yes–responses with negative valence andNo–responses with positive va-
lence. We also postulated that, because of their shared musical character,
the relationship between the pictures of the musical instruments and the
earcons in major and minor mode was stronger than that of the animals
and the earcons. We suggested that these two effects may have accumu-
lated into a relatively large reversed affective–congruency effect for the
instrument pictures in the Instrument−→Yes task, that in turn resulted in
an overestimation of the overall congruency effect.
So in Chapter 3, we showed that a transformation to major or mi-
nor mode indeed generated earcons capable of communicating affect and
that the differences between the congruent and incongruent conditions
showed that it is important to maintain affective correspondence in af-
fective human–computer interfaces. Our manipulation to switch from a
positive response assigned to the animate category to a negative response
highlighted that participants often choose response–selection methods
other than the one(s) intended by the experimenter.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 explored the multimodal affective–congruency effect in more
detail than the study reported in Chapter 3, using slightly different exper-
imental materials. In a picture–categorization task one group of partici-
pants was instructed to execute positive responses to the targets from the
animate category whereas another group of participants was instructed
to execute negative responses. For the former group we found a signif-
icant multimodal affective–congruency effect with shorter RT’s for the
congruent condition and longer RT’s for the incongruent condition. The
group executing the negative responses, however, showed a reversed
congruency effect: The congruent condition showed longer RT’s whereas
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the incongruent condition showed shorter RT’s. The reversed affective–
congruency effect was also significant.
The second–order interaction between the response assignments and
the congruencymanipulation is a prediction typical for the judgemental–
tendency model that Klauer and Stern proposed in 1992. We therefore
concluded that judgemental tendencies played an important role in the
realization of the multimodal affective–congruency effect. We reasoned
that the logically–complex instruction that we used for the group of par-
ticipants that had to press the No–button to pictures from the animate
category, triggered a (subconscious) search for a simpler response–selec-
tion procedure and proposed that a judgemental tendency as a result of
the emphasis on the animate category (see De Houwer et al., 2002) may
have provided a simpler translation.
In sum, in Chapter 4 we obtained further evidence of the multimodal
affective–congruency effect corroborating the findings in Chapter 3 and
we showed that the judgemental–tendency model, in retrospect, pre-
dicted our findings. The judgemental tendencies were proposed as a
strategy to realize a simpler stimulus–response translation.
Chapter 5
Besides the multimodal affective–congruency effect, in Chapter 3 as well
as in Chapter 4, a consistent processing advantage was obtained for the
category of animals. Similar processing advantages have been obtained
in other studies employing the animate versus inanimate distinction (e.g.,
Brousseau&Buchanan, 2004; deGroot, 1990; von Studnitz&Green, 2002)
and are sometimes reported to have their origin in the importance of the
animate category during the evolution of human cognition (Caramazza
& Shelton, 1998).
In the third and final experimental study that we report in Chapter 5,
we examined the animacy effect more closely. By carefully balancing the
experimental design and maintaining equivalent categorical homogene-
ity across the animate and inanimate objects, we showed that it was not
a general processing advantage for the animate category explaining the
animacy effect in Chapters 3 and 4 but differences in processing times
due to different categorization procedures (exemplar–based categoriza-
tion vs. hypothesis–based categorization; see Rosch & Lloyd, 1978). The
different categorization procedures were the result of differences in class
homogeneity between the animate and inanimate categories. We showed
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that the emphasis on one specific category (that was related to the judge-
mental tendencies in Chapter 4) did result in a processing advantage and
that this was not due to differences in processing times for selection of
positive or negative responses.
So inChapter 5we showed that it is important to ensure that categories
of stimuli are equivalently homogeneous, because failing to do so may
introduce artifacts in the (main) experimental findings.
6.2 Conclusions
The general findings in this thesis may be best summarized as follows.
The repeatedfindingsofmultimodal affective–congruency effects demon-
strate the intriguing but relatively unexplored interface between hot and
cold cognition and indicate, for the first time to our knowledge (but see
Van Esch–Bussemakers, 2001) that affectively–charged information that
is either presented auditorily or resulting from the output system gener-
ating positive or negative responses, is processed via the semantic system
and this affective information spreads across modalities. The (regular)
congruency effect, that we found for the group of participants that were
instructed to execute positive responses to the pictures of animals, indi-
cates that our assumption of positive affect associated with the auditory
flankers in major mode has not been invalidated (and v.v. for the minor
mode and negative affect). The specific (experimental) setup used to con-
vey affect between man and machine proved a decisive factor, however,
as indicated by the role of judgemental tendencies (Klauer & Stern, 1992)
in the realization of the multimodal affective–congruency effect. We will
now first deal with the findings that are relevant for human–factors re-
search and then elaborate on somemethodological and theoretical aspects
of the reported studies.
6.2.1 Important issues for human–factors research
Although we did not develop a new human–computer interface or ex-
plicitly formulated guidelines for such a new interface, human–factors
research has received a considerable amount of attention in this thesis. In
particular, we elaborated on the domain of affective computing and dis-
cussed the potential usability of stimulus–response compatibility (SRC)
paradigms for research in that area. In this section we focus on some of
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the results of the studies reported in this thesis that we consider to be
important for future human–factors research.
Based on the importance of affect and emotion in human–human in-
teraction, affective computing is a worthwhile human–factors research
effort to investigate the usability of affect to improve the quality of hu-
man–computer interaction (Picard, 1997). Our repeated findings of affec-
tive–congruency effects provide evidence to suggest that the interaction
between hot and cold cognition is important for task performance. It is
therefore relevant to maintain affective correspondence between infor-
mation presented in different modalities to ensure that performance in
an affective human–computer interface stays at an optimal level. The
affective–congruency effects also show that it is possible to investigate
performance in tasks employing affectively–charged stimuli and/or re-
sponses using relatively simple behavioral measurements in addition to
the more complex (neuro)physiological measurements of EEG, EMG, the
galvanic skin–response, and blood–volume pressure.
The knowledge that affectively–neutral earcons can be made affec-
tively charged using a transformation into major or minor mode can be
readily used by sound–designers that need to create such earcons for af-
fective human–computer interfaces. The affectively–charged earcons can
be used, for instance, to more easily distinguish between the emoticons
expressing positive moods and those expressing negative affect when the
emoticons are displayed in the long lists that can be selected in many
email or online–presence software–packages.
The (overall) reversed congruency effect that we have obtained in
Chapters 3 and for one group of participants in the study reported in
Chapter 4 show that sometimes it is difficult to a priori determine the con-
gruency relations in an experiment. Regarding human–factors research,
we conclude that is important to interpret human behavior within a re-
alistic context rather than in the context of isolated to devices, stimuli, or
stimulus–response relations (e.g., see Stammers, Carey, & Astley, 1990;
Strater & Bubb, 2003). The type and complexity of an instruction play an
important role in how participants (subconsciously) determine the most
efficient response–selection strategy. The chosen translation can be differ-
ent from the one that the experimenter expects based on his instruction.
The alternative response–selection strategymay in turn result in different
congruency effects than originally expected (e.g., reversed with slower
congruent conditions). This is an important aspect for human–factors
research to take into consideration because it indicates that behavior and
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responses should be measured not only in the reduced reality of the con-
trolled laboratory situations but also in real–life situations with devices
that are operated in everyday activities.
Finally, in line with Van Esch–Bussemakers (2001), we argue that
sound is not always the performance benefactor that it is considered
to be (e.g. see the auditory accessory effect; Keuss et al., 1990). The
earcons (also in major/minor mode) that Van Esch–Bussemakers (2001)
employed (see Bussemakers, de Haan, & Lemmens, 1999; Lemmens et
al., 2000, 2001) have more often shown performance degradation than
performance enhancement, when measured, for instance, in terms of
response–time latencies. This is also the case for the experiments re-
ported in this dissertation: the data consistently show slower responses
for nearly all conditions with sound than for the trials without sound
extracted from the same condition(s)1. We conclude that our participants
always process the auditory flankers to a certain extent and that they can
neither ignore the sounds nor shut them out completely, because humans
lack the physical ability to close the ear canal in the sameway that we can
close our eyelids to prevent distal stimuli from entering our visual sys-
tem. Perhaps the level of importance that is attributed in the instruction
to the auditory flankers is an important factor determining the degree of
the performance degradation or enhancement. Task–performance levels
follow an inverted–U curve depending on acoustic stimulation. We may
have failed to realize a setting in which optimal performance is ensured.
Considerate use of sound in human–computer interfaces, especially in
time–critical tasks, is therefore well advised. Despite that multimodal
perception is a fact of life for humans, its underlying processes are not
always transparent nor is multimodal perception always the fastest, sim-
plest, or most accurate mode of perception.
6.2.2 Remarks on the experimental paradigm
In this section we will comment on the paradigm that we have used in
the studies reported in this thesis to try and address critical remarks that
a reader may have. First, we discuss the stimuli that we employed and
then report on the experimental design. Finally, we discuss the paradigm
itself.
1Two exceptions to this rule can be found in the righthand panel of Figure 4.2 and
5.1.
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Materials
A potential concern with respect to the experimental materials that we
employed is that there were relatively few variations in the visual targets
and no variation in the auditory flankers. In the appendices to Chapter 4
we already confirmed our assumptions on the affective valence of the au-
ditory stimuli (Appendix 4.A, p. 63) and showed that a potential affective
charge of the visual targets was not involved in our findings and could
not account for other compatibility relations (see Appendix 4.B, p. 67).
Nevertheless, despite the finding that our auditory flankers in ma-
jor or minor mode were rated differently on affective charge, the affective
charge itself may have beenmodest due to the fact that we employed arti-
ficially generated auditory flankers. The modesty of the affective charge
of the auditory flankers in major or minor mode could then, partially,
account for the difficulties we encountered in finding the multimodal
affective–congruency effect. For instance, according to the dual–route
models, particularly, that are commonly used to explain many findings
in SRC research (see de Jong et al., 1994), compatibility effects stem from
quicker processing of the task–irrelevant stimulus feature along a direct
priming–like route. The quicker processing results in the pre–activation
of a response code based on the irrelevant stimulus that may or may
not overlap with the response code as a result of the (slower) process-
ing of the task–relevant stimulus feature (Ridderinkhof, 2002). In our
case, the possibly diminished affective charge of the auditory flankers
may result in slower, or less efficient processing along the direct priming
route, in turn resulting in smaller affective–congruency effects. Crow-
der (1985a), however, used chords consisting of sine waves that sounded
evenmore artificial than the ones used in our experiments. Nevertheless,
he observed a clear separation between major and minor chords with
the former being associated with positive affective valence and the latter
with negative valence (Crowder, 1985b). Moreover, using recordings of a
concert piano, on which the same major and minor chords were played,
did not result in a stronger affective–congruency effect (Lemmens & de
Haan, 2001). Therefore, we tentatively conclude that it is unlikely that
the affective charge was insufficiently pronounced within our auditory
flankers.
One tactic to investigate whether the strength of the affective charge
of auditory flankers is important in realizing the affective–congruency
effect is to use flankers with a pronounced affective charge, for instance,
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the sound of fingernails on a blackboard versus the sound of a purring
kitten. These sounds typically have a negative and positive affective
valence, respectively. The perception (and appreciation) of these types
of sounds, however, is dependent on individual likings. Some people
are not sensitive to the fingernails sound and other people have an utter
dislike of cats and kittens. Moreover, if a participant is sensitive to the
fingernails sound then the appraisal of that sound may well result in
distress (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988) or even an avoidance response
instead of a negatively valenced appreciation. Of course, other syntheti-
cally generated sounds can be conceived of that are perceived as pleasant
and unpleasant. We did not use such sounds, however, because of our
interest to investigatewhether earcons, which are shortmusical fragments
that serve as feedback signals in human–computer interfaces (Blattner et
al., 1989), can be enhanced with an affective charge.
Finally, we would like to reiterate our findings on the animacy effect.
Throughout the studies that are reported in this thesis and elsewhere
(e.g., Lemmens et al., 2000, 2001, 2003) we have consistently obtained a
processing advantage for the pictures of animals. Initially, we considered
this processing advantage to be the animacy effect that other researchers
also obtained (e.g., von Studnitz & Green, 2002). The animacy effect
may reflect the importance of the animate category that was established
during the evolution of human cognition and may even be physically
encoded in our brain (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998). However, closer
inspection (Ch. 5) of the stimuli used in the study reported in Chapter 4
showed that the emphasis in the instruction on one of the categories
was the likely cause of the shorter response–time latencies. We therefore
conclude that maintaining equivalent categorical homogeneity is import
to prevent artifactual response–time differences from distorting the key
experimental manipulation(s). This is, of course, not only the case for the
animate/inanimate distinction but for any other set of categories.
A blocked vs. a randomized design
The second issue concerns the blocked design that we used throughout
the studies reported in this thesis. Such a design, inwhich the congruency
relationship is kept constant in a trial block, is quite uncommon in SRC
research. Our choice to continue using such a design was motivated by
historical reasons as well as a simple choice to further investigate the
affective-congruency effects that we obtained using the blocked design,
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instead of investigating why we did not find congruency effects in a
randomized design. We currently entertain two explanations for the
absence of congruency effects in randomized designs.
First, it may be that the dimensional overlap between the affective va-
lence of the auditory flankers and the affective property of the responses
was less obvious than we had expected and thus sufficiently obscured in
the randomized design to escape reliable detection. A blocked design,
however, provides more opportunities to detect the dimensional over-
lap because, throughout the duration of a congruent or incongruent trial
block, the relationship between flanker and picture category, and thus
responses, is kept constant. In other words, returning to the argument
of the possibly diminished strength of the affective charge, the blocked
design ensured that the affective charge of the auditory flankers could be
picked up even more reliably, which in turn resulted in larger affective–
congruency effects. Note that, because of the predictive role of the audi-
tory flankers, we always intermixed an equal number of trials with and
without sound within a trial block, to try and prevent participants from
exploiting the 100% valid relationship between flanker and target. Also
note that participants were consistently slower when responding to trials
accompanied by auditory flankers, so it does not seem to be the case
that they were able to ignore the flankers completely. The rating study
reported in Appendix 4.A shows that flankers in major mode were rated
as positively charged whereas the flankers in minor mode were rated
as negatively charged, so, regarding the role of the auditory flankers, it
seems unlikely that their affective charge could not be exploited by the
cognitive system.
We position our second explanation on the level of the stimulus–
response sequence(s) by observing that the duration of the auditory
flankers was much longer relative to the mean overall response–time
latency of around 450ms. In the studies reported in this thesis we have
used auditory flankers with a duration of 2500ms and other studies have
used flankers of 1250ms (e.g. see Lemmens et al., 2001). We propose
that the extended duration of the flankers may have disturbed the nor-
mal experimental sequence of stimulus, response execution, (possible)
feedback, and inter–trial interval for the auditory stimuli specifically, by
blurring the border between an identity as auditory flanker next to a (vi-
sual) stimulus and an identity as auditory feedback signal. As a result,
participantsmay have interpreted the auditory flankers differently. Some
participants (perhaps those that are auditorily dominated, Giard & Per-
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onnet, 1999) may have interpreted the auditory flankers as such, whereas
other participants might have used them as (awkward) feedback signals.
Of course, this line of reasoning warrants further study. Using a random-
ized design, such a study can exploit briefly presented auditory flankers
of around 300ms, that are known to still have the conventional affective
connotation (Crowder, 1985a, 1985b).
The experimental paradigm overall
One could remark that more variation in our experimental paradigm
could perhaps have clarified our sometimes ambiguous results. In our
view, however, we have shown that the materials that we used to build
our paradigm adhered to our assumptions and therefore could not ac-
count for our findings by the introduction of an artifact. One part of
understanding results is to understand the quirks of a certain paradigm;
the latter can be done only by carefully manipulating single aspects of
the same paradigm to verify the impact of that aspect on the results.
Furthermore, the constancy of the design does not necessarily deterio-
rate the value of our findings. For instance, despite that participants have
ample opportunity to try and learn to ignore the auditory flankers (which
leads to performance benefits given the shorter response–time latencies
to trials without sound), our findings show a general slowing of RT’s
in every experiment reported here (and elsewhere, e.g., Lemmens et al.,
2000, 2001). From these findings we conclude that ignoring the auditory
flankers was not part of an energy–conservation strategy to reduce the
distracting factors in a task–set to a minimum. In other words, partici-
pants seem to have been continuously aware that the auditory flankers
were or were not contingent with the responses.
Themultimodal affective–congruency effect itself serves as another ex-
ample, here. The finding that it is realized only in blocked designs hints
at the involvement of strategies or effects of learning or conditioning,
instead of the natural overlap between stimulus– or response–features
that are common in SRC research. Nevertheless, it still is the overlap
between the affective charge of the flankers and the responses that re-
sults in two qualitatively different conditions for which (statistically) dif-
ferent response–time latencies are observed. Therefore the multimodal
affective–congruency effect shows that it is important tomaintain affective
correspondence, especially in situations where correspondence relations,
that are similar to ours, repeatedly occur.
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6.2.3 The involvement of judgemental tendencies
After having obtained a multimodal affective–congruency effect in the
study reported in Chapter 3 using a variation of the design employed
by Van Esch–Bussemakers (2001, Exp. 3, Ch. 2), we tried to determine
the cognitive basis of the congruency effect in Chapter 4. We found
that the response–assignment manipulation to ensure that positive as
well as negative responses were assigned to both categories of pictures,
interacted with our predetermined conception of affective congruency.
That is, the participants that were instructed to execute a No–response to
pictures from the animate category were faster doing so in the condition
that was a priori determined to be incongruent and they were slower in
the a priori determined congruent condition.
Klauer and Stern (1992) proposed the judgemental–tendency model
to explain how attitudes guide memory–based judgements. The second–
order interaction between response assignment and congruency that we
also observed in our study is typical of the judgemental–tendencymodel.
According to the model, first a response tendency to confirm or reject
the automatically–extracted affective relationship of, for instance, prime
and target is constructed. This tendency is then, in a controlled process,
compared to the instructed response that can be compatible or incom-
patible with the response tendency. For example, for a prime–target pair
like SUMMER–HONEST, a response tendency to confirm this relation is
created. If participants are instructed to execute positive responses to
word targets (e.g., in a lexical–decision task), then the response tendency
is compatible with the instructed (positive) response. However, if the
instructed response is a negatively–valenced response, then the response
tendency and the instructed response have an incompatible relationship
and slower responses are expected despite the fact that the prime–target
pair is affectively congruent. The response tendency is also referred to as
a judgemental tendency (De Houwer et al., 2002; Wentura, 2000).
The involvement of judgemental tendencies in the realization of the
multimodal affective–congruency effect is not unreasonable given that,
in our view, the affective–congruency effect represents an interaction be-
tween hot and cold cognition. The judgemental–tendency model (Klauer
& Stern, 1992) is an elegant formulation of this interaction incorporat-
ing aspects of hot as well as cold cognition. In this respect, the model
may be further exploited in the domain of cognitive control, specifically
in action– and error–monitoring research investigating the error–related
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negativity (ERN). The ERN is an ERP component thought to be related
to the detection of errors during stimulus and response processing (for a
recent review see de Bruijn, 2004).
Regarding the interpretation of the ERN, two competing theories are
proposed: the reinforcement–learning theory (Holroyd & Coles, 2002)
versus the conflict theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,
2001). However, a third proposal exists that relates the error–related neg-
ativity to affectively–motivated evaluations of actions and errors. The
affective theory of the ERN (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Pailing, Sega-
lowitz, Dywan, & Davies, 2002) hypothesizes that the ERN reflects the
emotional response to an error or the affective or motivational evalua-
tion of that error because the detection of “risks and opportunities is the
fundamental function of affective and emotional processing” (Wentura,
2000, p. 467; also see Frijda, 1988; Simon, 1967). This theory has not
been investigated extensively mostly because it is difficult to separate the
cognitive and affective factors that contribute to the ERN as these are
highly dependent (Yeung, 2004). In our view, it may be a worthwhile
research effort to investigate whether the judgemental–tendency model
can be used as a tool to disentangle the cognitive and affective factors that
contribute to the ERN.
6.2.4 Contours of a general model of hot and cold
cognition
In experimental psychology, the processing of information related to emo-
tion and affect (also called “hot” cognition, see Abelson, 1963; Hollnagel,
1999) for a long time has been considered to be completely separated
from rational decision–making (“cold” cognition; e.g. see Sorrentino &
Higgins, 1986a).2 However, in line with other findings of affective–com-
patibility effects (e.g., De Houwer & Eelen, 1998; De Houwer & Randell,
2004; Fazio et al., 1986), the multimodal affective–congruency effect and
particularly the reversed affective–congruency effect (that we observed
for one group of participants of the study reported in Chapter 4), in our
view, show that cold cognition can be influenced by hot cognition: The
2Note that, regarding the model that we outline in this section, the use of the un-
differentiated term “hot cognition” may require some elaboration. Theories of emotion
processing usually distinguish between primary or basic approach and avoidance emo-
tions and more cortical or cognitively determined emotions like pride and inspiration
(Ortony et al., 1988; Van Egmond et al., 2004). We regard the affective valence of our
auditory flankers as part of the latter type of emotion.
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evaluation of (task–irrelevant) affective information present in the stimu-
lus influences the interpretation or realization of the instructed responses.
We suggest that hot cognition influences cold cognition in such away that
the (entire) cognitive system remains in an affectively–consistent state.
Therefore, cognition (actively) tries to maintain information–processing
strategies that do not result in affectively–inconsistent states.
It does so by (automatically; see Fazio et al., 1986) extracting all af-
fective information present in its surroundings and evaluating the infor-
mation for affective consistency (Klauer & Stern, 1992; Wentura, 2000). If
some of the affective properties are inconsistent with others, cold cogni-
tion suffers as performance measures on simple rational decisions show
(e.g., RT’s or errors; see DeHouwer & Eelen, 1998; DeHouwer & Randell,
2004;Wentura, 2000). Moreover, if inconsistency is detected, the cognitive
system tries to return to a more consistent state by (actively) changing
those aspects of information processing that are affectively inconsistent
to a state in which they are consistent with the other affective features
of information processing. We propose that hot cognition wraps like a
blanket around cold cognition and that the radiant heat of hot cognition
permeates cold cognition, slowly warming up the latter in an effort to
make the entire cognitive system as affectively–consistent as possible.
The blanket model of the interface and interaction between hot and
cold cognition is in agreement with the spreading–activation account of
affective–compatibility effects that has received a lot of attention (e.g. see
De Houwer & Randell, 2004; Spruyt et al., 2004) whether this account is
framed in the traditional semantic–network version or in a PDP version
(Wentura, 2000). In the former version of the spreading–activation ac-
count usually emotion nodes are proposed to mediate the representation
of affective valence (Bower, 1981). Semantic nodes that are positively or
negatively charged connect to the respective emotion node. In this way,
the emotion nodes function much like the language nodes in the BIA
model for bilingual language perception (Dijkstra & Van Heuven, 1998):
through the connections with the emotion node(s) “affectively–charged
activation” spreads to the semantic nodes, and the emotion nodes them-
selves are activatedmerely byprocessing affectively–charged information
(Wentura, 2000). According to the blanket model, the emotion nodes are,
of course, part of the blanket and, once activated, spread their influence
into the colder part(s) of cognition. Their influence, for instance, results
in affective–priming effects for prime–target pairs that are semantically
unrelated.
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The blanket model capitalizes more on the process of verifying the
consistency of the affective state of the cognitive system when the judge-
mental–tendency model, another important model for affective–compat-
ibility effects, is concerned. Again, the processing of stimuli automatically
extracts affective information that activates the emotion nodes. But in this
case, the influence of the affective information spreads beyond the pre–
activation (or priming) of semantic concept nodes. This is indicated by
the (multimodal) affective–congruency effect that is due to the dimen-
sional overlap between the auditory flankers and the responses. Fol-
lowing the judgemental–tendency model, the affective features present
in the stimulus–response array are compared and verified for affective
consistency. In addition, if, according to the blanket model, affective
consistency can be better maintained using a different stimulus–response
translation than the one instructed, the alternative translation is preferred
and elected above the instructed one. It is clear that the heat of the blanket
of hot cognition extends to processes of decision making (also see Brave
& Nass, 2003; Hoffman, 1986) and response selection (this thesis). Note
that the above description of the blanket model only provides the outline
of our tentative model.
In conclusion, in this thesis we presented three studies and a theo-
retical review that show that hot cognition can influence cold rational
decision–making, corroborating earlier findings of affective–compatibil-
ity effects (e.g., De Houwer & Eelen, 1998). Moreover, affective informa-
tion does not need to be presented in the same modality to which the
target stimulus is delivered because affective information is processed
and compared in a cross–modal fashion. The influences of hot cognition
on cold cognition sometimes depend on strategies to minimize cognitive
expenditure and to strive for affectively–consistent states of cognition.
We propose the blanket model of hot and cold cognition that summa-
rizes our findings and lines of reasoning. The present project has also
provided insights that are useful for human–factors research on affective
computing.
Discovering and then trying to understand the multimodal affective–
congruency effect has been a highly complicated but rewarding pursuit.
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting
Emotie en het verwerken van informatie met een emotionele lading is
deel van ons dagelijks leven. Soms is emotie het onderwerp van ge-
sprek; veel vaker, echter, beı¨nvloedt emotioneel geladen informatie ons
rationele gedrag op manieren waarvan we ons niet bewust zijn. Zo is
bijvoorbeeld bekend dat een positieve stemming resulteert in flexibelere
en creatievere strategiee¨n om puzzels of problemen op te lossen, terwijl
een negatieve stemming geassocieerd blijkt met doelgericht en gecon-
centreerd probleemoplossingsgedrag (Brave & Nass, 2003). De term ‘hot
cognition’ (Abelson, 1963; Hollnagel, 1999) wordt in dit kader vaak ge-
bruikt om naar het verwerken van emotionele ofwel affectieve informatie
te verwijzen, terwijl de term ‘cold cognition’ gebruikt wordt om te refe-
reren naar rationele beslissingen. Onderzoek naar de rol van affectieve
informatieverwerking in menselijke cognitie kan resulteren in kennis die
gebruikt kan worden om de mens–machine interactie te verbeteren.
Recentelijk formuleerde Picard (1997) een nieuw onderzoeksgebied
binnen de cognitieve ergonomie dat zich specifiek richt op de emotionele
aspecten van mens–machine interactie. Zij noemde dit gebied ‘affective
computing’. Een deel van het fundamentele onderzoek naar affectieve
informatieverwerking maakt gebruik van stimulus–respons compatibi-
liteits paradigma’s. In dit proefschrift geven we aandacht aan beide
thema’s in een serie van experimenten waarin we onderzoeken wat de
effecten van geluiden zijn in mens–machine interfaces. De vragen die we
proberen te beantwoorden zijn: (a) Is het mogelijk om geluiden te cree¨ren
die een affectieve lading dragen en (b) kunnen we de effecten van deze
lading meten zonder gebruik te maken van metingen van fysiologische
reacties? (c) Kunnen deze affectieve geluiden zinvol ingezet worden in
een mens–machine interacties? En, tot slot, (d) kunnen we aangeven
hoe de affectieve stimuli de informatieverwerking beı¨nvloeden? Deze
thema’s en onderzoeksvragen worden in het eerste hoofdstuk van dit
proefschrift nader uiteengezet.
De zes hoofdstukken in dit proefschrift richten zich, achtereenvol-
gens, op het belang van een beter begrip van de raakvlakken tussen ‘hot’
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en ‘cold cognition’ voor de cognitieve ergonomie (hoofdstukken 1 en 2).
Daarna proberenwe aan te tonen dat ook inmultimodale (d.w.z. audiovi-
suele) contexten, affectieve informatie invloedkanuitoefenenop rationele
beslissingen (hoofdstukken 3 en 4). Vervolgens onderzoeken we hoe het
uitwisselen van informatie tussen ‘hot’ en ‘cold cognition’ plaatsvindt
(hoofdstuk 4) en evalueren we onze onderzoeksmethode (hoofdstuk 5).
In hoofdstuk 6, tot slot, geven we een samenvatting van onze bevindin-
gen en schetsen we een tentatief model van de relaties tussen ‘hot’ en
‘cold cognition’.
Hoofdstuk 2 start met een beschrijving van ‘affective computing’ (Pi-
card, 1997). Daarna introduceren we stimulus–respons compatibiliteits
(SRC) onderzoek en beschrijven we hoe de effecten van taak–irrelevante,
affectieve informatie gemeten kunnen worden met behulp van compa-
tibiliteitseffecten. We beargumenteren dat compatibiliteitseffecten een
waardevolle aanvulling vormen op de directe maar complexe metingen
van fysiologische reacties, zoals hartslag en bloeddruk, die vaak binnen
‘affective–computing’ onderzoek geanalyseerd worden.
Binnen fundamenteel onderzoek naar affectieve informatieverwer-
king worden vaak compatibiliteitseffecten gebruikt. Het verwerken van
affectieve informatie werd lange tijd gezien als compleet gescheiden van
de koude, rationele informatieverwerking. In onze review van de lite-
ratuur laten we echter zien dat deze stelling onjuist is (zie bijv. Fazio et
al., 1986; Sorrentino & Higgins, 1986a). Veel van de taken die gebruikt
worden om affectieve informatieverwerking te onderzoeken kunnen een-
voudig in een taxonomie van SRC–taken (Kornblum et al., 1990) geplaatst
worden. Als voorbeeld besprekenwe de affectieve variant van de Simon–
taak (DeHouwer & Eelen, 1998; Simon, 1990) die de onderzoeksgebieden
van SRC en affectieve informatieverwerking verbindt. Deze taak staat
model voor de taak die wij in dit proefschrift gebruiken.
Tot slot bespreken we in dit hoofdstuk het onderscheid in affectieve
waarde van de majeur en mineur connotatie in Westerse muziek. We
beargumenteren dat de welbekende associatie van een blije, positieve
perceptie van muziekwerken geschreven in majeur en een negatieve, be-
droefdere interpretatie van muziek in mineur geschikt is om positieve en
negatieve lading via de auditieve modaliteit aan te bieden. Het onder-
scheid tussen majeur en mineur hebben wij in de verdere hoofdstukken
gebruikt om stimuli te cree¨ren die we volgens het patroon van een affec-
tieve Simon–taak multimodaal, d.w.z. audiovisueel, aan proefpersonen
aanboden.
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Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft een studie waarin we onderzochten of we met
behulp van SRC–paradigma’s de invloed van de taak–irrelevante, affec-
tief geladen informatie konden ontdekken. We cree¨erden twee (sets van)
akkoorden: C–drieklanken in majeur en dezelfde drieklanken in mineur.
Deze geluiden werden gelijktijdig aangebodenmet de visuele stimuli die
de proefpersonen moesten categoriseren. Omdat de responsen die de
proefpersonenmoesten uitvoeren ook affectief geladenwaren, verwacht-
tenwe kortere reactietijden enminder fouten voor de congruente trials (Ja
& Majeur; Nee & Mineur) dan voor de incongruente trials (Ja & Mineur;
Nee & Majeur).
De resultaten van het experiment datwe in hoofdstuk 3 rapporteerden
lieten echter het tegenovergestelde zien. We veronderstelden dat deze
resultaten tot stand kwamen door een onverwachte en speciale relatie
tussen het muzikale karakter van de plaatjes van de instrumenten en de
geluiden die we gebruikten. In het algemeen concludeerden we echter
dat de majeur/mineur connotatie de uitvoering van een taak waarin ook
affectieve componenten voorkomen, beı¨nvloedt.
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoeken we hoe het compatibiliteitseffect uit het
3e hoofdstuk tot stand kwam. Hiertoe voerdenwe een aantal controlestu-
dies uit en pasten we de methode uit hoofdstuk 3 aan door, bijvoorbeeld,
de plaatjes van de muziekinstrumenten te vervangen door (algemenere)
plaatjes van niet–levende objecten. We lieten twee verschillende groe-
pen proefpersonen de instructievarianten uitvoeren die in hoofdstuk 3
beschreven staan.
Voor de eerste groep van proefpersonen, die de simpele instructie
“Is het een plaatje van een dier?” ontvingen, lieten de resultaten uit het
experimentditmaal een congruentie–effect zien zoalswedat verwachtten.
Dat wil zeggen dat de reactietijden op congruente trials korter waren
dan die op incongruente trials. De resultaten uit de tweede groep van
proefpersonen, die een moeilijkere, logisch–complexe instructie “Is het
geen plaatje van een dier” ontvingen, waren echter niet volgens onze
verwachting.
We vonden dat deze proefpersonen in de congruente conditie, die
we als de snellere conditie kenmerkten, langzamer waren dan in de in-
congruente conditie. Echter, volgens de regels van overlap (Kornblum
et al., 1990) tussen affectieve lading van majeur/mineur geluiden en van
Ja/Nee–responsen zou deze instructie geen invloed mogen hebben ge-
had. Immers, majeur en Ja zijn steeds congruent of het Ja–antwoord nu
een reactie is op een plaatje van een dier of een plaatje van een niet–
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levend object. We verklaren dit resultaat door te verwijzen naar het
‘judgemental–tendency’ model van Klauer and Stern (1992). Dit model
veronderstelt dat er twee stadia zijn in het bepalen wat de invloed is van
affectieve informatie in een stimulus. De cruciale voorspelling van dit
model is dat er situaties kunnen voorkomen waarin stimulus–respons
relaties, die a priori als congruent worden bestempeld, resulteren in ge-
dragsmaten die eigenlijk bij een incongruente stimulus–respons relatie
horen. Voor onze tweede groep van proefpersonen betekende dit dat de
conditie die wij a priori als congruent kenmerkten, bijv. een plaatje van
een schoen (Ja–antwoord) met een majeur akkoord (positieve lading) in
werkelijkheid door het cognitief systeem als incongruent gezien werd,
bijvoorbeeld omdat het plaatje van de schoen in vergelijking met de refe-
rentiecategorie in de vraag (dieren) negatief was en dit incongruent was
met het majeur akkoord.
In hoofdstuk 5 proberen we de oorzaak van een eerder geobserveerd
stabiel reactietijdvoordeel voorde categorie vandieren te achterhalen. We
postuleerdendrie verklaringen voor dit reactietijdvoordeel. Het voordeel
kon zijn ontstaan (a) door het belang van levende zaken gedurende de
evolutie van de mens (Caramazza & Shelton, 1998), of (b) als resultaat
van verschillen in de (relatieve) homogeniteit van de plaatjescategoriee¨n
(zie b.v. Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Lloyd, 1978), of (c) door de nadruk die we
in de instructie legden op de categorie van dieren.
In het experiment gebruikten we weer de plaatjes van muziekinstru-
menten als tweede categorie om homogeniteit als oorzaak uit te sluiten.
We hanteerden het tussengroepsdesign uit hoofdstuk 4, maar voor de
tweede groep van proefpersonen formuleerden we een instructie die dit-
maal de categorie van muziekinstrumenten benadrukte. De resultaten
toonden eenduidig aan dat het reactietijdvoordeel niet door het onder-
scheid levend versus niet–levend was ontstaan zoals we eerder conclu-
deerden, maar door de nadruk die in de instructie op de categorie van
dieren werd gelegd.
Het zesde en laatste hoofdstuk gebruiken we om de eerdere hoofd-
stukken samen te vatten en conclusies te formuleren aan de hand van
de vragen die we eerder in deze samenvatting stelden. We sluiten het
hoofdstuk af met een schets van de contouren van een model van ‘hot’
en ‘cold cognition’ dat onze redeneringen en bevindingen samenvat.
We concluderen dat we geslaagd zijn in de opzet om geluiden te
cree¨ren die een affectieve lading dragen. Dit blijkt uit de congruentie–
effecten die we hebben gevonden. Deze effecten geven tevens aan dat de
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effecten van een affectieve lading op taakafhankelijke informatieverwer-
king ook met behulp van SRC–paradigma’s gedetecteerd kunnen wor-
den. Deze bevindingen kunnen gebruikt worden inmens–machine inter-
faces waarin met geluiden affectief geladen informatie gecommuniceerd
moet worden. Hierbij is het belangrijk om gelijkheid tussen alle affectie-
ve ladingen na te streven om een optimale mens–machine interactie te
waarborgen.
Het fundamentelere deel van onderzoek in dit proefschrift betrof de
vraag hoe de invloed van ‘hot cognition’ op ‘cold cognition’ tot stand
komt en meer specifiek hoe de affectieve lading van de majeur en mi-
neur geluiden invloed heeft op de responskeuze in een categorisatietaak.
We tonen aan dat, net als bijvoorbeeld in de affectieve Simon taak (De
Houwer & Eelen, 1998), het cognitief systeem in staat is om verschillen-
de bronnen van affectieve informatie te detecteren en te vergelijken op
gelijkheid van affectieve lading. Het ‘judgemental–tendency’ model van
Klauer and Stern (1992) verklaart het beste de resultaten die we verkrij-
gen wanneer proefpersonen een moeilijke, logisch–complexe instructie
moeten uitvoeren. Tevens concluderen we dat het effect waarschijnlijk
op dezelfde manier tot stand komt als compatibiliteitseffecten in SRC–
onderzoek. We komen tot deze conclusie omdat de informatieverwer-
kingsstappen van het ‘judgemental–tendency’ model overeen lijken te
komenmet de beschrijvingen van omgekeerde compatibiliteitseffecten in
het ‘logical–recoding’ model van Hedge and Marsh (1975).
We sluiten het hoofdstuk af met een voorstel voor een model dat onze
bevindingen en redeneringen samenvat. In dit model wordt de ‘cold
cognition’ omhuld door de ‘hot cognition’, waardoor ‘cold cognition’
opgewarmd kan worden door ‘hot cognition’. We veronderstellen daar-
naast dat het gehele cognitieve systeem streeft naar een toestand waarin
minimale affectieve inconsistentie heerst, uit een strategie tot energiebe-
houd.
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